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1 
HOSPITAL MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
Roger D. Blair,
*
 Christine Piette Durrance
**
 & D. Daniel Sokol
***
 
Abstract: Consolidation via merger both from hospital-to-hospital mergers and from 
hospital acquisitions of physician groups is changing the competitive landscape of the 
provision of health care delivery in the United States. This Article undertakes a legal and 
economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a 
physician group. This Article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. 
Luke’s Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) decision—proposing a type of analysis that the 
district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that we hope future courts 
undertake when analyzing mergers in the health care sector. First, the Article addresses the 
question of how best to frame the acquisition of a physician group by a hospital—is the 
merger horizontal, vertical, or potentially both? In undertaking this analysis the Article 
examines the broader issue of the treatment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in 
antitrust law. ACOs are short of full integration and as such, a potential contractual 
alternative for hospitals and physician groups to an acquisition. A hospital acquisition of a 
physician practice also has implications for how to view competitive effects in the context of 
ACOs. Indeed, in St. Luke’s the Ninth Circuit suggests that integration short of full merger 
was a possible alternative. Second, the Article examines the justification for integration as a 
way to address countervailing power in health care, the reduction of transaction costs, and 
potential cost and quality efficiencies. Third, the Article applies the economics of these 
issues to merger case law generally and specifically to the St. Luke’s decision. Ultimately, the 
Article finds the economic analysis of the Ninth Circuit lacking. Finally, the Article offers 
policy implications of the decision and concludes with some suggestions to improve health 
care antitrust analysis in practice for litigated cases to make such analysis better follow 
economic principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Case developments in recent years have renewed attention on the 
antitrust implications of health care mergers. This attention is 
particularly important given the current trend of government victories 
against merging parties in merger challenges.
1
 The United States 
                                                     
1. Lisa Jose Fales & Paul Feinstein, How to Turn a Losing Streak into Wins: The FTC and 
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Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, 
Inc.
2
 was the result of a successful challenge of the anti-competitive 
merger of two hospitals in Georgia that attempted to shield the merger 
via state action.
3
 While the Supreme Court has not ruled in decades on 
the substantive aspects of antitrust mergers, two recent circuit court 
antitrust health care cases have received significant attention—
ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. FTC
4
 in the Sixth Circuit and Saint 
Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd.5 
(St. Luke’s) in the Ninth Circuit. 
Efficiencies, known in the business world as synergies,
6
 play an 
important role in justifying mergers. By efficiencies, we mean decreases 
in price, increases in quality and/or output, or increases in innovation.
7
 
Because the ProMedica district court found no efficiencies in the 
transaction, that case is, from a doctrinal standpoint, less interesting than 
the St. Luke’s decision in the Ninth Circuit that found both pro-
competitive (efficiencies) and anti-competitive (monopoly power) 
effects present in the merger.
8
 The Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the 
district court’s decision to enjoin the merger.9 In doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit had the opportunity to undertake a serious economic analysis of 
the merger and to clean up dated case law that has failed to incorporate 
rigorous economic analysis of efficiencies and other competitive effects. 
Unfortunately, irrespective of the outcome, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
was lacking. A more rigorous analysis would have provided guidance to 
improve case law for future courts. It also would bring predictability to 
merger cases decided in the shadow of the law in terms of merger 
planning for hospital acquisitions of physician groups, hospitals 
acquisitions of other hospitals, and for negotiations between merging 
parties and antitrust enforcers more generally. The lack of economically 
                                                     
Hospital Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Fall 2014, at 31, 31. 
2. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). 
3. Id. 
4. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014). 
5. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
6. See, e.g., Michael Goold & Andrew Campbell, Desperately Seeking Synergy, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 131, 143 (“When synergy is well managed, it can be a boon, creating 
additional value with existing resources.”). 
7. Howard Shelanski, Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement, in 1 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 451, 451 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel 
Sokol eds., 2015). 
8. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786–92. 
9. Id. at 793. 
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informed case law in St. Luke’s is a missed opportunity to clarify merger 
law in light of the Supreme Court’s absence in merger case law 
development.
10
 
In the St. Luke’s case, St. Luke’s Health System (St. Luke’s) sought to 
acquire the Saltzer Medical Group (Saltzer).
11
 Saltzer was the largest 
independent multi-specialty physician group in Idaho.
12
 St. Luke’s 
already had integrated eight primary care physicians within its Nampa 
hospital system.
13
 The combination of Saltzer’s sixteen primary care 
physicians and St. Luke’s eight primary care physicians raised antitrust 
concerns because the combined entity would control eighty percent of 
the adult primary care physicians in the Nampa area.
14
 Private plaintiffs 
brought suit to enjoin the merger under both federal and state antitrust 
laws.
15
 Subsequently, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
State of Idaho also sought to enjoin the merger.
16
 The district court 
consolidated the actions and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
17
 On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.18 
The St. Luke’s decision is based on a changing reality in health care. 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA)
19
 has served as the impetus toward 
increased health care consolidation for hospitals.
20
 Acquisitions by 
                                                     
10. For a discussion of the development of antitrust merger case law, see generally Hillary 
Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2039 
(2015). 
11. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781–82. 
12. Id. at 781. 
13. Id. 
14. Id.  
15. Id. at 782. 
16. Id.  
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 793. 
19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); see also Leemore Dafny et al., 
Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance Industry, 102 
AM. ECON. REV. 1161 (2012) (providing an economic analysis of the changing health care 
landscape of which the ACA is a part). 
20. Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows Challenges 
to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 699 (2010) (warning that incentives to charge higher rates 
will create increased consolidation); David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market 
Share, and Consolidation, 310 JAMA 1964, 1964 (2013) (“A large reduction in use of inpatient 
care combined with the incentives in the Affordable Care Act is leading to significant consolidation 
in the hospital industry.”); Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation — Still More to 
Come?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 (2014) (“The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has unleashed a 
merger frenzy, with hospitals scrambling to shore up their market positions, improve operational 
efficiency, and create organizations capable of managing population health.”).  
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hospitals of physician groups are also on the rise.
21
 In 2015, health care 
spending was $3.1 trillion.
22
 The largest portion of health care 
expenditure remains hospital services, at more than five percent of 
GDP.
23
 Health care costs, therefore, are a significant policy issue and 
ways to reduce costs (and increase quality of care) remain critical to the 
U.S. economic outlook going forward. 
Additional consolidation is inevitable,
24
 but antitrust enforcement 
offers no clear solutions. Getting the antitrust analysis wrong can have 
significant effects—in hospital mergers, post-merger price increases that 
may be as high as forty to fifty percent of pre-merger costs.
25
 We believe 
that health care will remain a fixture in antitrust into the foreseeable 
future. This is particularly true for health care mergers. Understanding 
St. Luke’s in light of these challenges in health care suggests that the 
stakes in health care merger cases are significant. Courts must be more 
effective and sophisticated in their guidance to better shape the changing 
health care landscape.
26
 
This Article undertakes a legal and economic examination of the St. 
Luke’s decision—the type of analysis that the district court and Ninth 
Circuit should have taken and that we hope future courts will take when 
analyzing mergers in the health care sector. First, the Article addresses 
the question of how best to frame an acquisition of a physician group by 
a hospital—is the merger horizontal, vertical, or potentially both? In 
undertaking this analysis, the Article examines the broader issue of the 
treatment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in antitrust law. 
                                                     
21. See, e.g., Caroline S. Carlin et al., The Impact of Hospital Acquisition of Physician Practices 
on Referral Patterns, 25 HEALTH ECON. 439 (2015) (published online by Wiley Online Library) 
(providing a case study of such acquisitions). 
22. Tami Luhby, Health Care Spending Expected to Grow Faster, CNN MONEY (July 28, 2015, 
7:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/news/economy/health-care-spending/ 
[https://perma.cc/3QNH-53RP]. 
23. Christopher Garmon, The Accuracy of Hospital Merger Screening Methods (FTC Bureau of 
Econ., Working Paper No. 326, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/accuracy-hospital-merger-
screening-methods [https://perma.cc/3GU7-J9KW]. 
24. Paul B. Ginsburg & L. Gregory Pawlson, Seeking Lower Prices Where Providers Are 
Consolidated: An Examination of Market and Policy Strategies, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1067, 1067 
(2014). 
25. Martin Gaynor, Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and 
Policy Maze, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1088, 1089 (2014).  
26. In the area of hospital acquisitions of physician groups, for the most part, such acquisitions 
fall outside the reporting requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012). 
Consequently, the antitrust agencies typically find out about mergers after the fact, which makes 
divestiture remedies more difficult given the post-merger consummation. See Dionne Lomax, A 
History of Evanston and Analysis of the Merger Remedy, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, May 27, 
2008 (discussing the Evanston remedy). 
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Vertical integration via ownership means that a hospital and its 
physicians are within the same ownership umbrella and fully integrated 
both financially and clinically. ACOs are short of full integration and as 
such, are a potential alternative to acquisition for hospitals and physician 
groups through some amount of contractual integration short of 
ownership. A hospital acquisition of a physician practice has 
implications beyond the merger context. Such a merger has 
repercussions more broadly on how to view issues of competitive effects 
in the context of ACOs. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s suggested 
integration short of full merger as a possible alternative to an 
anticompetitive merger.
27
 Second, the Article examines the justification 
for integration as a way to address countervailing power in health care, 
the reduction of transaction costs, and cost and quality efficiencies. 
Third, the Article applies the economics of these issues to merger case 
law generally and specifically to the St. Luke’s decision. Ultimately, the 
Article finds the economic analysis of the Ninth Circuit lacking. Finally, 
the Article offers policy implications of the decision and concludes with 
some suggestions to improve health care antitrust analysis in practice for 
litigated cases to make such analysis better comport with economic 
principles. 
I. HOSPITAL ACQUISITIONS OF PHYSICIAN GROUPS: 
HORIZONTAL, VERTICAL, OR BOTH? 
Hospital acquisitions of physician groups implicate both horizontal 
(such as the merger of two direct competitors)
28
 and vertical (such as the 
merger of complimentary products within the production or distribution 
chain)
29
 issues in antitrust merger law. While there have been many 
litigated merger decisions based on horizontal theories of harm, there 
has not been a vertical merger case decided before a circuit court since 
1987
30
 and no Supreme Court vertical merger cases since 1972.
31
 As a 
result, the contours of what might be at stake in such a case remain 
relatively unclear in vertical merger cases compared to horizontal 
                                                     
27. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 791 
n.15 (9th Cir. 2015). 
28. See generally Bryan Keating & Robert D. Willig, Unilateral Effects, in 1 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 466. 
29. See generally Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 551. 
30. Alta. Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987); see 
also Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
31. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
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mergers. Unfortunately, the St. Luke’s decision reached the horizontal 
theory of harm regarding a concentration of physician groups and did 
not address the vertical issues.
32
 We focus on the vertical issues in both 
law and economics below to address the sorts of questions that the St. 
Luke’s Ninth Circuit court should have addressed. We note that the 
implications of St. Luke’s are not limited merely to mergers that have 
both horizontal and vertical elements to them. Instead, the wider 
implications of the decision impact ACOs more generally, a form of 
integration short of merger. 
The antitrust concern with mergers is that the combined firm will be 
able to raise prices or reduce quality or innovation unilaterally or via 
coordinated effects post-merger.
33
 This Part examines both types of 
concerns in the context of hospital acquisitions of physician groups. 
Such acquisitions involve behavior that has both vertical and horizontal 
elements. The behavior is vertical in that the acquisition provides 
complementary services of hospitals and physicians. The horizontal 
element is that the hospital may already have physicians in the same 
specialty, which would lead to a merger of otherwise competing 
practices. A similar analysis can be undertaken for behavior short of 
merger, under ACOs.
34
 This analysis of ACO behavior is important, 
because courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s, suggest that 
efficiencies could be achieved short of a merger,
35
 which might 
implicate ACOs. 
A. Vertical Merger Law 
Vertical mergers often present more difficult challenges than 
horizontal mergers in antitrust case law. That is because, as with vertical 
conduct, vertical mergers are presumed to be pro-competitive due to the 
efficiencies that they generate.
36
 The exact standards of the legal test in 
                                                     
32. Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Damages, Saint Alphonsus Med. 
Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 1:12-cv-00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 
2014 WL 407446, at *14 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015)), 2012 WL 
5882652. 
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRK7-5J2L]. 
34. For an economic analysis of ACOs, see H.E. Frech III et al., Market Power, Transaction 
Costs, and the Entry of Accountable Care Organizations in Health Care, 47 REV. IND. ORG. 167, 
167–68 (2015) (finding physician concentration by organization has marginal effect but that 
physician geographic concentration leads to less ACO entry). 
35.  St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *14. 
36. Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade 
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case law to evaluate the effects of vertical mergers is less well developed 
than horizontal mergers. Indeed, the last time that the Supreme Court 
addressed a vertical merger case was 1972.
37
 Prior vertical merger 
decisions, most notably Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
38
 were written 
during an era in which fairness and other non-economic based concerns 
motivated antitrust outcomes.
39
 During this era, the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) 1968 Merger Guidelines also included a discussion on 
vertical mergers, with a viewpoint to protect competitors over 
competition.
40
 
Though case law and the DOJ Guidelines of the 1960s and 1970s 
incorrectly showed hostility to vertical merger policy,
41
 the antitrust 
concern that they purportedly were based on—that of foreclosure—is 
nevertheless a credible concern in examining vertical mergers.
42
 A 
number of more recent cases in which deals have been abandoned or 
conditioned suggest that there may be situations in which the concern of 
foreclosure could present an anti-competitive problem, as we note 
below. This includes where the upstream and downstream markets 
would be highly concentrated post-merger, and where potential inputs or 
where distribution channels may not be supplied to downstream rivals, 
as we discuss below in Part II. 
The government recognized the concern with the possibility of 
foreclosure in a vertical merger context in the 1984 Merger Guidelines,
43
 
although under narrow circumstances.
44
 Because of a very dated set of 
                                                     
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 218 (2005). But see JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER 
CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2015) (suggesting that 
U.S. antitrust policy has been too lax in a number of vertical merger cases).  
37. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
38. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see also FTC v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 
(1957). 
39. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust 
Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2527–29 (2013); D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between 
Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1251–52 (2015). 
40. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 8–10 (1968), reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. 
REP. (CCH) ¶ 4510 (Aug. 9, 1982) [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES], 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSB3-
B472]. 
41. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2058–59. 
42. See generally Salinger, supra note 29. 
43. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [https://perma.cc/242D-
TM5K]. 
44. Id. at 26,835, § 4.21. 
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cases, the courts have not offered much in the form of guidance of how 
to address efficiencies in vertical mergers.
45
 However, statements by 
senior officials at both agencies suggest that such efficiencies play a role 
in vertical merger analysis.
46
 
The U.S. antitrust agencies have challenged vertical mergers based on 
a vertical foreclosure theory in recent years, causing some transactions 
to be modified or abandoned. These include Ticketmaster/LiveNation,
47
 
Google/ITA,
48
 and Comcast/Time Warner,
49
 among others. Similarly, 
the DOJ’s Policy Guide to Merger Remedies addressed the potential 
harm of vertical mergers, noting that “vertical mergers can create 
changed incentives and enhance the ability of the merged firm to impair 
the competitive process.”50 
A general discussion of vertical mergers sets the stage for an 
application of vertical merger analysis in the context for St. Luke’s. The 
case presented a possible framing of the vertical case in which a hospital 
sought to acquire an unaffiliated physician group.
51
 This is what the 
private plaintiffs in the case alleged in their complaint. The private 
plaintiffs noted that, “St. Luke’s will gain a near monopoly share in the 
Nampa, Idaho market for adult primary care physician services market. 
It will continue its practice of foreclosing virtually all competition for 
the hospital admissions of the physician practices it acquires.”52 Put 
differently, the integration of the physicians group into St. Luke’s would 
mean that there would be a lack of referrals to competing hospitals. 
Consequently, there would be a reduction in competition for both 
                                                     
45. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 387 n.380 (7th ed. 2013) (compiling a list of 
antitrust cases). 
46. Id. at 391–92. 
47. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
00139, 2010 WL 5699134 (D.D.C. July 30, 2010), 2010 WL 975407, http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
case-document/file/513376/download [https://perma.cc/8JDX-TRRE]. 
48. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 5, 2011), 2011 WL 2444825, http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/497671/download 
[https://perma.cc/3SLQ-3KZ8]. 
49. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comcast Corporation Abandons Proposed Acquisition of 
Time Warner Cable After Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission 
Informed Parties of Concerns (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-corporation-
abandons-proposed-acquisition-time-warner-cable-after-justice-department [https://perma.cc/8378-
825M]. 
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 5 (2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/17/272350.pdf [https://perma.cc/XF85-
JRLG]. 
51. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2015). 
52. Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Damages, supra note 32, at 2.  
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inpatient and outpatient services. 
Why didn’t the government bring the vertical case against St. 
Luke’s?53 In part, the FTC did not need to do so (unlike the private 
plaintiffs) because the FTC had standing to bring the case as a much 
more legally cautious horizontal case.
54
 The FTC also benefitted from 
defining the market narrowly as a horizontal case.
55
 Nevertheless, failing 
to decide the case under a vertical theory of harm (or at least plead both 
vertical and horizontal theories of harm in the same complaint), 
contributes to the lack of cases litigated on the merits of a vertical 
theory. The advantage to a vertical theory in St. Luke’s is that we believe 
a consent decree would not have been possible due to the all-or-nothing 
nature of the hospital merger. Such a case would have offered much 
needed clarity in case law and vertical merger policy. The most recent 
Supreme Court vertical merger case is from 1972.
56
 The only “recent” 
vertical merger decided case (from 1997) is HTI Health Services, Inc. v. 
Quorum Health Group, Inc.,
57
 where the court did not find substantial 
foreclosure. Quorum was a private case in which a hospital 
unsuccessfully challenged the merger of a private hospital and two 
physician groups in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The plaintiff hospital 
brought both a horizontal theory of harm (physician services and 
managed care purchasing markets) and a vertical theory of harm (acute 
inpatient hospital services market). To be sure, there have been 
numerous vertical mergers challenged since 1997 but these have resulted 
in consents, settlements, or deals that were abandoned.
58
 
                                                     
53. Salop and Culley suggest that the nature of the foreclosure (either input or customer 
foreclosure) was unclear. See Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Potential Competitive Effects of 
Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide for Practitioners 20 n.39 (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2404&context=facpub 
[https://perma.cc/6YKF-2HCP] (“This concern [of customer foreclosure in St. Luke’s] might be 
classified instead as input foreclosure in that the payers tend to be third-party insurance companies 
or managed care operators, and that the patients are inputs who are steered to one or another 
hospital by the doctors. Where the merging firms produce complementary products, it is often 
possible to categorize the foreclosure either as input or customer foreclosure.”). 
54. On antitrust standing and foreclosure more generally, see Roger D. Blair & Christine A. 
Piette, Antitrust Injury and Standing in Foreclosure Cases, 31 J. CORP. L. 401 (2006).  
55. Complaint for Permanent Injunction, FTC v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., No. 13-cv-116-
BLW (D. Idaho Mar. 26 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/03/ 
130312stlukescmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E5W-M6KY]. 
56. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
57. HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1997). 
58. See Salop & Culley, supra note 53, at app. 
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B. Implications of Vertical Merger Analysis on ACOs 
1. Vertical Integration Short of Mergers 
Vertical merger analysis has broader implications because antitrust 
analysis of vertical mergers corresponds to vertical analysis short of 
merger. Such analysis has been under-developed in the case law. The St. 
Luke’s case and the issue of vertical integration implicates more than 
just vertical merger law. It also impacts vertical integration through 
financial and clinical integration via ACOs. The Ninth Circuit St. Luke’s 
decision also suggests that courts do not understand the benefit of 
ACOs. ACOs contain both horizontal and vertical elements, yet the 
Ninth Circuit recently analyzed the merger only horizontally.
59
 The court 
also rejected any potential efficiencies in the structure,
60
 thereby casting 
into doubt the ability to effectively implement ACOs in the future. To 
provide context for ACO implications of the St. Luke’s merger, this 
Section provides an overview of ACO competition issues. 
Antitrust enforcement with regard to physician practices in the 
modern era begins with the 1996 FTC/DOJ Statements of Antitrust 
Enforcement in Health Care (the Statements).
61
 The Statements were 
written at a time of HMO growth. As such, the Statements recognized 
the possibility that integration that was short of a full merger between 
hospital and physician groups as part of “clinical integration” would fall 
under “rule of reason” treatment rather than “per se”62 treatment that the 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society
63
 
otherwise demanded.
64
 In Maricopa County, the Supreme Court found a 
per se violation of physician controlled foundations for medical care that 
had fixed the maximum reimbursement rates for their members.
65
 This 
arrangement lacked any financial integration and, as such, the 
relationship was viewed as a price fixing agreement and therefore per se 
                                                     
59. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 783–92 (9th Cir. 2015). 
60. Id. at 791–92. 
61. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996) [hereinafter FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS], http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0000.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5TJ-ASTT].  
62. For a background and treatment of the per se rule and rule of reason, see, for example, 
Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in 
Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733–37 (2012). 
63. 457 U.S. 322 (1982). 
64. FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS, supra note 61, at 82–87. 
65. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 355–57. 
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illegal.
66
 The problem with Maricopa County is that the Court did not 
give sufficient attention to the possibility that clinical integration, rather 
than financial integration, might also create pro-competitive effects that 
would overcome the potential anti-competitive effects and therefore 
would deserve rule of reason treatment.
67
 
The Statements diverged from Maricopa County based on the 
potential efficiencies that such integration might have.
68
 However, the 
meaning of “clinical integration” remained elusive.69 The agencies first 
attempted to define this concept in Statements 8 and 9: 
Physician network joint ventures that do not involve the sharing 
of substantial financial risk may also involve sufficient 
integration to demonstrate that the venture is likely to produce 
significant efficiencies. Such integration can be evidenced by 
the network implementing an active and ongoing program to 
evaluate and modify practice patterns by the network’s 
physician participants and create a high degree of 
interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to 
control costs and ensure quality. This program may include: (1) 
establishing mechanisms to monitor and control utilization of 
health care services that are designed to control costs and assure 
quality of care; (2) selectively choosing network physicians who 
are likely to further these efficiency objectives; and (3) the 
significant investment of capital, both monetary and human, in 
the necessary infrastructure and capability to realize the claimed 
efficiencies.
70
 
This formulation of clinical integration was quite broad, which may 
have been by design.
71
 The Statements were not the last word in vertical 
                                                     
66. Id. at 357 (“[T]he fee agreements . . . are among independent competing entrepreneurs. They 
fit squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold.”). 
67. Mark R. Patterson, Justice Stevens and Market Relationships in Antitrust, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1809, 1821 (2006); Rocco J. De Grasse, Note, Maricopa County and the Problem of Per Se 
Characterization in Horizontal Price Fixing Cases, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007, 1051–62 (1984). 
68. FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS, supra note 61, at 80 (“Experience indicates that, in general, more 
significant efficiencies are likely to result from a physician network joint venture’s substantial 
financial risk sharing or substantial clinical integration. However, the Agencies will consider a 
broad range of possible cost savings, including improved cost controls, case management and 
quality assurance, economies of scale, and reduced administrative or transaction costs.”). 
69. Robert F. Leibenluft, Antitrust and Provider Collaborations: Where We’ve Been and What 
Should Be Done Now, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 847, 853–54 (2015). 
70. FTC/DOJ STATEMENTS, supra note 61, at 72–73.  
71. Robert F. Leibenluft, The ACO Antitrust Policy Statement: Antitrust Enforcement Meets 
Regulatory Rulemaking, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2011, at 1, 2 (“The FTC and DOJ explained that 
they did not wish to offer more details regarding what might constitute clinical integration out of 
concern that more prescriptive language might dampen innovation. Officials of these antitrust 
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integration, however. The FTC staff started to offer advisory opinions as 
to the application of the Statements.
72
 
2. ACO Policy Statement 
The antitrust agencies have offered more recent guidance on vertical 
relations short of merger. To encourage increased competition through 
the ACA, the DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC issued a Statement of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(ACO Policy Statement).
73
 
ACOs create the potential for great benefit in the health care system. 
However, ACOs also create potential for anti-competitive harms 
including higher prices and/or lower quality.
74
 Consequently, the 
antitrust agencies set out ACO Guidelines to assist ACOs in navigating a 
path that leads to increased consumer welfare. This analysis addresses 
many of the issues that emerge in integration via merger between a 
hospital and physician group. 
a. ACO Policy Statement Background 
DOJ and FTC offered the ACO Policy Statement to provide greater 
antitrust clarity regarding ACO formation. The ACO Policy Statement is 
premised on ACOs’ ability to promote greater efficiencies through 
higher quality of service and lower cost between hospitals (upstream) 
and physician groups (downstream).
75
 As a matter of design, the 
implementation of ACO Guidelines does not live up to its promise. 
Consequently, we believe that rather than vertically integrate via 
contract, firms will choose to do so via merger. Firms will do so because 
firms will choose the greater certainty of vertical integration via 
acquisition because the complexities of clinical integration through 
ACOs outweigh the value of it. 
The goal of ACOs is to provide lower-cost health care with better 
                                                     
agencies feared that providers might feel constrained to using arrangements that closely followed 
whatever model the guidelines would describe, at the expense of developing their own approaches 
better suited to meet their particular needs.”). 
72. Id. at 3–4. 
73. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
74. Richard M. Scheffler, Accountable Care Organizations: Integrated Care Meets Market 
Power, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 639, 640–41 (2015). 
75. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026 (noting that ACOs 
provide opportunities for innovation in health care and corresponding benefits to consumers). 
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quality.
76
 Implementation issues for ACOs have been difficult such that 
reaching this goal has not been easy.
77
 Under the Affordable Care Act, 
incentives have been set up under the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP) to reward improved pay to the ACOs for improved 
performance.
78
 Under the ACA, ACOs have been tasked with 
development of efficiencies in Medicare.
79
 Under the MSSP program, 
according to Professor Greaney, ACOs “constitute an intermediary 
model for reform that does not require providers to assume insurance 
and technical risk for care provided to beneficiaries but still provides 
financial incentives to reorient delivery arrangements.”80 
b. Antitrust Analysis of the ACO Policy Statement 
The FTC and DOJ issued the ACO Policy Statement in October 
2011.
81
 The Statement created “safety zones” for ACOs that operate as 
safe harbors—situations in which the presumptive anti-competitive harm 
that would run afoul of antitrust law is unlikely.
82
 ACO participants who 
provide a “common service” and have a combined market share of thirty 
percent of each common service in each participant’s Primary Service 
Area fall within the safety zone.
83
 Clinical integration standards are set 
not by the antitrust agencies but instead by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS).
84
 
Do the pro-competitive restraints outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects? The question with ACOs is whether or not there is efficiency-
enhancing integration. If there is, the ACO will escape per se analysis 
under Maricopa County.
85
 In essence, the antitrust agencies offer rule of 
reason treatment if ACOs: “(1) meet the CMS eligibility requirements; 
(2) participate in the MSSP; and (3) use with commercial plans the same 
governance, leadership structure, and clinical and administrative 
                                                     
76. Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and 
Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2014). 
77. Id. (calling implementation “a wrenching process”). 
78. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012)). 
79. Id. 
80. Greaney, supra note 76, at 6. 
81. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
82. Id. at 67,028. 
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 67,027–28. 
85. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
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processes that they use under the MSSP.”86 
The final ACO Policy Statement does not provide sufficient clarity on 
the issue of how best to clinically integrate in a way that leads to lower 
cost and better quality while complying with antitrust law.
87 
The most 
recent ACO statement merely notes, “[c]linical integration can be 
evidenced by the joint venture implementing an active and ongoing 
program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the venture’s 
providers and to create a high degree of interdependence and 
cooperation among the providers to control costs and ensure quality.”88 
Unfortunately, the ACO Guidelines also go on to say that the 
determination of clinical integration will be on a case-by-case basis.
89 
This adds to the uncertainty of clinical integration.
90
 This uncertainty can 
push hospitals toward a decision to integrate via merger rather than 
through contractual integration, particularly in small acquisitions that 
might not be detected due to being below the HSR reporting threshold
91
 
or because the creeping acquisitions are in less concentrated markets. 
Consequently, there has not been as much certainty regarding ACOs 
as hospitals interested in ACO development might want. Thus far there 
has only been one advisory opinion request issued by the FTC since the 
introduction of the ACO Policy Statement.
92
 Yet, more ACOs are in 
                                                     
86. Leibenluft, supra note 71, at 5–6. 
87. Id. at 7 (noting “[t]he ACO Antitrust Policy Statement takes a much more mechanistic, almost 
regulatory, approach”). 
88. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027. 
89. Id. 
90. Lawrence P. Casalino, The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical Integration, and the 
Organization of Physician Networks, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 569, 579 (2006); Thomas L. 
Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration, Exclusivity, and Market Power in Provider Contracting, 
14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 59, 69 (2014). 
91. See the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 18a 
(2012), and the related Premerger Notification Rules, 16 C.F.R. §§ 801–803 (2015). 
92. Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Michael E. 
Joseph (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/ 
norman-physician-hospital-organization/130213normanphoadvltr_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TRB-
BYME]. Note, however, that there were advisory opinions prior to the Policy Statement. See Letter 
from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to John J. Miles (Feb. 19, 
2002), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions/advisory-opinion-miles-02-19-02 
[https://perma.cc/7ZEK-NALA]; Letter from David R. Pender, Acting Assistant Dir., Bureau of 
Competition, FTC, to Clifton E. Johnson & William H. Thompson (Mar. 28, 2006), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/suburban-health-organization/ 
suburbanhealthorganizationstaffadvisoryopinion03282006.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2KR-9YSN]; 
Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Christi J. Braun & 
John J. Miles (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-
opinions/greater-rochester-independent-practice-association-inc./gripa.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VQL-
UHV3]; Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, to Christi J. 
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operation,
93
 which may suggest that those ACOs that are operating at the 
margins in terms of behavior that may be anti-competitive have not 
asked for advisory opinions. ACOs may also be complicated to 
implement in practice, which might push providers to merge rather than 
partially integrate through ACOs. Particularly due to opportunities to 
benefit from arbitrage of different reimbursement rates, ACOs may be 
too complex given the potential returns for providers.
94
 
Much remains unknown as to the pro- versus anti-competitive value 
of ACOs. Professor Scheffler of Berkeley explains: 
At present, regulators like the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Department of Justice are adapting existing metrics to 
measure the impact of the market power of ACOs. Moreover, 
we do not know what quality improvements to expect from 
ACOs or how such improvements should be measured. Is the 
ACO producing value for patients, and is it worth the cost? How 
should the value equation be measured and evaluated? 
Compared to what? These questions can only be addressed with 
ongoing research.
95
 
i. Research into ACOs Is Inconclusive 
Although ACOs are an important new innovation, there has been little 
academic work on the topic. The limited empirical work on ACOs 
suggests mixed results.
96
 One issue that makes the study of ACO 
effectiveness difficult to measure is that what to measure is not always 
clear. For example, there are some limits to the ACO rules, including 
how they measure quality.
97
 The ability of ACOs to be effective has 
                                                     
Braun (Apr. 13, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advisory-opinions/tristate-
health-partners-inc./090413tristateaoletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2XN-Y9T7]. 
93. We note that there had been over 700 ACOs created by the end of 2014. Deborah L. Feinstein 
et al., Accountable Trust Organizations and Antitrust Enforcement: Promoting Competition and 
Innovation, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 875, 884 (2015). However, the merger wave in health 
care has been equally significant during this period in terms of hospital-to-hospital mergers and 
hospital acquisitions of physician groups. 
94. Melanie Evans, Few Medicare ACOs Earned Bonuses in 2014, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 25, 
2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150825/NEWS/150829922 
[https://perma.cc/9U7A-3MJB] (“Three out of four Medicare accountable care organizations did not 
slow health spending enough to earn bonuses last year, a continuation of mixed results for an 
initiative that federal officials have targeted for rapid expansion.”). 
95. Scheffler, supra note 74, at 643. 
96. Gail R. Wilensky, Lessons from the Physician Group Practice Demonstration—A Sobering 
Reflection, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1659, 1659 (2011).  
97. James M. DuPree et al., Attention to Surgeons and Surgical Care Is Largely Missing from 
Early Medicare Accountable Care Organizations, 33 HEALTH AFF. 972, 973 (2014) (“Notably, 
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been questioned based in the theoretical economics literature through 
formal modeling. As a recent working paper by Frandsen and Rebitzer 
concludes, “Our estimates suggest that even minimally sized ACOs with 
modest cost reduction targets will generally not be self-financing unless 
extremely large economies of scale or productivity improvements 
accompany ACOs.”98 To create large economies of scale to make ACOs 
workable, therefore, requires some amount of market power. Yet, it is 
precisely the sort of market power that scale provides that creates the 
dilemma for antitrust risk exposure. 
ii. Policy Implications 
The lack of clarity in the ACO Final Policy Statement and difficulty 
of implementation has important policy consequences with regard to 
ACOs and antitrust mergers. We believe, based on our conversations 
with numerous health care providers, that the lack of clarity has 
increased the desire for health provider consolidation through the 
acquisition of physician groups. Rather than risk antitrust exposure 
through the implementation of ACOs (in a way that would maximize 
their value), a number of hospitals have gone about vertically integrating 
via merger with physician practices.
99
 Such hospitals have done so as a 
way to address productivity and scale through merger. These hospitals 
have done so with small acquisitions as a deliberate way to “fly under 
the radar” of federal and state antitrust agencies because such 
transactions fall under HSR reporting requirements.
100
 When courts, 
such as the one in St. Luke’s, suggest that efficiencies could have been 
effectuated under circumstances less than a merger, consolidation via 
                                                     
none of CMS’ thirty-three ACO quality measures directly addresses surgery or surgical care.”). 
98. Bringham Frandsen & James B. Rebitzer, Structuring Incentives Within Organizations: The 
Case of Accountable Care Organizations 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20034, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20034 [https://perma.cc/9LVS-LBG6]. 
99. U.S. Health Services Total Deal Value for Q1 2014 Rose 152%, Pointing to Renewed Deals 
Confidence Post-ACA Implementation, According to PwC US, PR NEWSWIRE (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-health-services-total-deal-value-for-q1-2014-rose-
152-pointing-to-renewed-deals-confidence-post-aca-implementation-according-to-pwc-us-
259926451.html [https://perma.cc/GL8Q-H8ZM] (“The current trend of physician practice 
acquisitions by physician practice management companies is expected to continue in the near term 
as specialty-based physician groups look for ways to respond to reimbursement changes and higher 
regulatory costs of maintaining their practices.”). 
100. See supra note 91 for the HSR rules. On the impact of hospital acquisitions of physicians, 
see Scott Baltic, Monopolizing Medicine: Why Hospital Consolidation May Increase Healthcare 
Costs, MED. ECON. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-
economics/content/tags/hospital-employment/monopolizing-medicine-why-hospital-consolidation-
?page=full [https://perma.cc/5WFQ-TXTM]. 
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merger suggests that hospitals believe such consolidation faces fewer 
transaction costs than ACOs and that perhaps ACOs are less effective 
than their original promise may have suggested. 
C. Recent Enforcement Trends 
Overall, the lack of clarity as to the meaning of ACOs does not mean 
that the antitrust agencies have been silent as to behavior that is 
unambiguously anti-competitive. Certain behavior that is per se illegal 
remains clear because there is no integration, whether clinical or 
financial. This includes DOJ enforcement against an association of 
chiropractors in South Dakota that had an eighty percent market share in 
the state.
101
 The chiropractors in the association did not have any 
financial or clinical integration but were able to raise their 
reimbursements from insurers through joint negotiation. As part of the 
settlement with DOJ, the association was prohibited from price setting 
and joint negotiation for its members.
102
 The FTC also has been active in 
enforcement of per se violations. This includes a recent case against 
nephrologists in Puerto Rico that lacked any financial or clinical 
integration but participated in a group boycott against insurers that did 
not agree with the nephrologists’ demands for an increase in 
reimbursement rates.
103
 
D. Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Health Care Integration 
ACOs and vertical mergers also implicate a larger question of how 
transaction cost economics works in the health care setting.
104
 
Transaction cost economics suggests that there is a “make or buy” 
decision for firms—firms can integrate via ownership or via contract.105 
Organizational complexity may dictate whether or not there are 
economies of scale or diseconomies of scale to create greater benefit to 
ownership rather than contract.
106
 These issues emerge in health care 
                                                     
101. Complaint at 1, United States v. Chiropractic Assocs. of S.D., No. 4:13-cv-04030, 2013 WL 
5595936 (D.S.D. Sept. 3, 2013), 2013 WL 1727875. 
102. Id. at *2.  
103. P.R. Nephrologists, 155 F.T.C. 874 (2013), 2013 WL 8364917. 
104. Renee A. Stiles et al., The Logic of Transaction Cost Economics in Health Care 
Organization Theory, 26 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 85 (2001). 
105. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) [hereinafter 
Coase, Nature of the Firm]; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3 
(1988).  
106. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
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consolidation and impact whether or not a hospital will choose to merge 
with a physician group or merely contract via an ACO.
107
 
The St. Luke’s case did not address potential transaction costs 
between the hospital and the physicians group. A more robust economic 
analysis of the proposed merger would have examined scale and scope 
efficiencies of the acquisition in terms of the transaction costs and would 
have analyzed whether or not an ACO would have been a possible 
alternative to a full merger. The analysis also would have suggested 
what the limits of ACOs may be. 
1. Basics of Transaction Cost Economics 
Organizational structure impacts the costs associated with physician 
groups.
108
 Structure impacts size and scope of practice. Consequently, 
the impact of financial incentives changes in importance based on the 
size of the group practice.
109
 
We first begin with some basic economic description within a 
transaction cost economics (TCE) framework. Hospitals produce acute 
care hospital services. To do so, they need physician services. It is easy 
to appreciate the need for the traditional hospital-based physicians—
anesthesiologists, emergency room physicians, pathologists, and 
radiologists. But hospitals also need admitting and attending physicians. 
By the same token, physicians need a place to send patients who cannot 
be treated without the sophisticated medical equipment and specialized 
care that only hospitals can provide.
110
 
The relationship between hospitals and physician groups can be 
organized through contracts or through formal integration.
111
 In some 
cases, a group of physicians may construct their own hospital.
112
 These 
                                                     
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 103–30 (1985) (explaining how organization complexity and size can 
lead to inefficiencies); Todd R. Zenger, Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: 
Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size, 40 
MGMT. SCI. 708, 708–09 (1994) (showing how smaller firms are better to address agency cost 
problems). 
107. Frech et al., supra note 34. 
108. Roger Feldman, The Economics of Provider Payment Reform: Are Accountable Care 
Organizations the Answer?, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 745, 746 (2015). 
109. Martin Gaynor & Paul Gertler, Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships, 26 
RAND J. ECON. 591 (1995). 
110. See generally SHERMAN FOLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 
(David Alexander et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013). 
111. Lawton Robert Burns et al., Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Physicians: A Tale of 
Two Tails, 15 ADVANCES HEALTH CARE MGMT. 39, 40 (2013). 
112. PAUL FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 304–05 (Dave Garza et al. eds., 7th ed. 2011). 
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are usually relatively small, specialized hospitals, e.g., a women’s 
hospital specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. More common, 
however, is the acquisition of multi-specialty physician groups by 
general acute care hospitals. In either case, the integration of hospitals 
and physician groups may be motivated by efficiency considerations.
113
 
Hospitals may desire to acquire physician groups in order to reduce 
transaction costs. Transaction costs are any expenditures of resources 
associated with the use of the market mechanism in transferring a good 
or service from one party to another. Coase (a Nobel Prize winner)
114
 
described three categories of costs that are associated with the use of the 
price system.
115
 
a. Search Costs 
Contracts create various costs. First, there are search costs that must 
be borne in order to discover the relevant prices, identities, 
compatibility, and willingness to join forces.
116
 Hospitals must identify 
physician groups that best align with their needs, and physician groups 
must desire what the hospital offers. In other words, the hospital and 
physician groups must match. The hospital and physician groups want to 
find a way to maximize the surplus available in the market. The 
challenge is to figure out how to share the combined surplus, which may 
be quite contentious. 
b. Negotiation 
Second, use of the market mechanism often necessitates the 
negotiation (and, later, enforcement) of contracts that stipulate precisely 
what the hospital and physician group agree to do.
117
 These contracts 
                                                     
113. Thomas T.H. Wan et al., Integration and the Performance of Healthcare Networks: Do 
Integration Strategies Enhance Efficiency, Profitability, and Image?, INT’L J. INTEGRATED CARE, 
June 1, 2001, at 1. 
114. Ronald H. Coase – Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
economic-sciences/laureates/1991/coase-facts.html [https://perma.cc/G4P3-ZDMT] (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2016).  
115. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 105. In this classic paper, Coase explains that this 
replacement of a market exchange with an internal (within the firm) transfer is the defining 
characteristic of a firm. Without that replacement, firms, as we know them, would not exist. A later, 
more extensive treatment of this same topic is provided in WILLIAMSON, supra note 105. A 
thorough survey of this literature is provided by Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost 
Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 135 (R. Smalensee & R.D. Willig, 
eds., 1989). 
116. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 105, at 390. 
117. Frech et al., supra note 34 (discussing transaction costs in the health care setting). 
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usually specify not only the price and quantity of the health care service, 
but also such details as coverage, scheduling, office space, clerical and 
administrative costs, and the like. Such detailed specification of the 
items affecting the purchase and sale is required to ensure that both 
parties will live up to the terms of the agreement, because performance 
incentives may change drastically after the initial contract is signed.
118
 
Generally, the longer the term of such contracts, the greater the costs of 
negotiation and enforcement. The added costs result because specifying 
future contingencies becomes increasingly problematic as the time 
horizon is extended.
119
 Moreover, the more complex the transactions 
become, the more difficult it is to specify all future contingencies and 
the parties’ contractual obligations, should those contingencies arise.120 
And any contingencies that are not covered by the terms of the contract 
leave one or both firms vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the other 
party.
121
 
c. Reduced Flexibility 
Finally, in addition to negotiation and enforcement costs, there are 
costs of reduced flexibility associated with market transactions that 
make use of long-term contracts.
122
 If the market price of the input falls 
during the term of the contract, the hospital will bear an opportunity cost 
in being unable to take advantage of the lower price because of its 
obligation to purchase the input at the higher price specified in the 
                                                     
118. On opportunism more generally, see Christina Ahmadjian & Joanne Oxley, Using Hostages 
to Support Exchange: Dependence Balancing and Partial Equity Stakes in Japanese Automotive 
Supply Relationships, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 215 (2006) (applying Williamson’s hostage-
exchange model). 
119. See generally Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction 
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 336–38 (1995).  
120. Id. On incomplete contracts, see OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 1–2, 72–82 (1995), and Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of 
Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289, 289 (2006). 
121. Scott E. Masten, About Oliver E. Williamson, in FIRMS, MARKETS, AND HIERARCHIES: THE 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 37, 41 (Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece eds., 
1999) (“As transactions become more complex and the environment more uncertain, the limitations 
of contracting as a safeguard against opportunism grow, increasing the attraction of other 
institutional arrangements that better support adaptive, sequential decision making while 
circumscribing or redirecting opportunistic tendencies.”); see also Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity 
and Vertical Integration, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998); Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and 
Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 102–03 (2002). 
122. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Pretia Ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term 
Contracts, 34 J.L. & ECON. 69 (1991). 
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contract.
123
 A similar opportunity cost will be borne by the physician 
group of the input if the market price increases unexpectedly during the 
term of the contract.
124
 Changes in market conditions involving aspects 
other than price (for example, the introduction of new medical 
equipment, new medical devices, changes in Medicare rules, changes in 
Medicare programs, new information technology systems) can impose 
analogous costs on either party.
125
 The basic point here is that, by 
entering into the contractual agreement, each party locks itself into a 
predetermined pattern of behavior in order to assure the other party that 
it has not misrepresented its future intentions. An unexpected alteration 
of market conditions often makes this behavior suboptimal and, 
therefore, costly ex post. 
2. Health Care and Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction costs implicate vertical relations within the hospital and 
physician setting. By replacing the system of market exchanges with 
internal transfers, integration may substantially reduce these transaction 
costs.
126
 Instead of having hospitals and physician groups negotiate the 
sale of a health care service, we have managers organize the production 
and transfer of the health care service between the upstream division and 
the downstream division of the integrated firm.
127
 As Williamson 
(another Nobel Prize winner)
128
 has persuasively argued, replacing 
market transactions with administrative decisions can often be expected 
to reduce transaction costs for two fundamental reasons: (a) reducing 
health care costs via integration and (b) better aligning incentives.
129
 
                                                     
123. Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, Strategic Integration of Hospitals and Physicians, 
25 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 5–6 (2006). 
124. Id. 
125. Jeffrey Clemens et al., The Anatomy of Physician Payments: Contracting Subject to 
Complexity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21642, 2015). 
126. Frech et al., supra note 34, at 170, 172. 
127. Id. at 168–69. 
128. Oliver E. Williamson – Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
economic-sciences/laureates/2009/williamson-facts.html [https://perma.cc/9LDK-CNHM] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
129. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442–47 (1974) [hereinafter Williamson, Economics of Antitrust]; Oliver 
E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Consideration, 61 AM. 
ECON REV. 112, 113–14 (1971). 
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a. Reducing Health Care Costs via Integration 
Internalizing the transfer through integration alters the relationship 
between the affected parties (hospital and physician group) from one of 
being largely adversaries to one of being partners. Without integration, 
one party often stands to gain profits at the expense of the other party. 
Both parties have an incentive to increase their own profits without 
regard to the impact on the other party, which may reduce their 
combined profits. Williamson refers to this sort of behavior as 
opportunistic.
130
 
By joining together the profits of the two parties, vertical integration 
brings about a convergence of goals and thereby eliminates (or greatly 
reduces) the incentive for this sort of counter-productive behavior.
131
 
Such convergence, in turn, reduces the costs of completing the given 
transaction because the parties involved will no longer find it necessary 
to expend resources designing and negotiating contracts to protect 
themselves from the anticipated opportunism of the other party. 
b. Better Aligning Incentives 
Vertical integration is expected to reduce transaction costs because 
the incentive and control options available to the hospital are much more 
extensive for intrafirm as opposed to interfirm transfers.
132
 It is far easier 
for the manager of a hospital to discover and, as necessary, reward or 
penalize the behavior of employees than it is to exercise similar controls 
over the behavior of another firm. In the former case, access to the 
relevant data (for example, through internal audits) is improved, and 
rewards or penalties (for example, through promotions, raises, and 
firings) are more easily administered. In the latter case, discovery of 
opportunistic behavior is relatively costly, and haggling or litigation may 
be the only means available for encouraging more desirable 
performance. And failure to elicit such performance can lead to a 
termination of the contractual relationship, which, in turn, requires 
search for a new supplier and negotiation of a new contract, all of which 
entails additional costs. 
Thus, by combining the profit streams of the hospital and physician 
                                                     
130. See, e.g., Williamson, Economics of Antitrust, supra note 129, at 1444–45. Vertical 
integration, however, does not remove principal-agent problems, which can lead to a reduction in 
the total surplus available. 
131. See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 123 (explaining the theory behind such integration 
although not finding it empirically in their study). 
132. Frech et al., supra note 34, at 168–70. 
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group, integration increases the amount of information available to the 
parties to the transaction and sharpens the incentives of all parties to 
behave in a manner that promotes the profitability of the overall 
operation. 
A particular situation expected to give rise to substantial transaction 
costs is that involving “transaction-specific assets.”133 Such assets arise 
from investments that are undertaken to support some particular set of 
market transactions.
134
 For example, a hospital may invest in an MRI, 
proton knife, DaVinci equipment, or other complex medical equipment. 
Physicians may, however, want a greater share in the profits generated 
through use of this equipment and associated services, or they may 
decline to use them. 
The problem with transaction-specific investments is that, once these 
assets are put in place (i.e., the costs are sunk), the party that owns them 
becomes vulnerable to what has been termed the “hold-up problem.”135 
Specifically, the physician group will recognize that the hospital’s 
trading options become severely limited ex post and, consequently, may 
attempt to capture a portion of the returns for itself when the contract 
comes up for renewal. Or, in the extreme, the physician group may 
simply renege on the contract and insist upon negotiation. The potential 
for such opportunistic behavior may prevent the hospital from 
undertaking these sorts of investments, despite their potentially 
profitable and socially beneficial use. 
An obvious solution to this situation is vertical integration. If both 
parties to the transactions for which the assets are specifically designed 
are owned by the same entity, incentives for hold-up are substantially 
reduced if not eliminated entirely. Thus, vertical integration may be 
motivated by the desire to avoid hold-up problems stemming from 
transaction-specific investments.
136
 
                                                     
133. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978). 
134. See Williamson, Economics of Antitrust, supra note 129. 
135. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 106, at 47 (describing the hold-up problem’s opportunism as 
“self-interest seeking with guile”). 
136. A number of empirical papers have confirmed the importance of transaction-specific assets 
in firms’ decisions to vertically integrate. See, e.g., Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, Supplier 
Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON. 206 (1982); 
Pablo Spiller, On Vertical Mergers, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 285 (1985); Avi Weiss, The Role of Firm-
Specific Capital in Vertical Mergers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1992); Avi Weiss, Vertical Mergers and 
Firm-Specific Physical Capital: Three Case Studies and Some Evidence on Timing, 42 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 395 (1994). 
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c. Economies of Scale and Scope 
TCE provides a theory for integration. This theory helps to explain 
the push for vertical integration between hospitals and physician groups. 
There are two elements that drive the incentive for integration—scale137 
and scope
138
 economies. 
Scale economies are possible when the fixed cost of production can 
be spread over more units, which means that the average cost of 
production of each unit declines. In health care, these economies of scale 
may be a function of sharing the cost of specialized equipment over a 
larger group of patients or the negotiation of better reimbursement rates 
by hospitals that have scale with insurance providers.
139
 Diseconomies 
of scale (where a larger size leads to suboptimal results) occur when 
organizational complexity leads to coordination and management 
inefficiencies that lead to the average cost increasing rather than 
decreasing. In the health care setting, this may occur because of multi-
specialty groups that are multisite or are less efficient with regard to time 
and resources.
140
 Some studies suggest that scale economies in health 
care support increased consolidation.
141
 However, scale economies may 
not always be possible in health care because of complexities in the 
delivery of health care in multifaceted organizational structures. Both 
theoretical and empirical work suggests that diseconomies of scale are 
possible in health care.
142
 
                                                     
137. Aubrey Silberston, Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice, 82 ECON. J. 369, 369 (1972) 
(“Classic economies of scale relate to the effect on average costs of production of different rates of 
output, per unit of time, of a given commodity, when all possible adaptations have been carried out 
to make production at each scale as efficient as possible.”). 
138. David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 223 (1980). 
139. Colin Preyra & George Pink, Scale and Scope Efficiencies Through Hospital 
Consolidations, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 1049 (2006). 
140. Thomas P. Weil, Multispecialty Physician Practices: Fixed and Variable Costs, and 
Economies of Scale, 25 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 70, 75–76 (2002). 
141. Stephen M. Shortell & Kathleen E. Hull, The New Organization of the Health Care Delivery 
System, in 2 STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR A CHANGING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 101, 101 (Stuart E. 
Altman & Uwe E. Reinhardt eds., 1996) (“Early evidence suggests that organized delivery systems 
that are more integrated have the potential to provide more accessible coordinated care across the 
continuum . . . than less integrated delivery forms.”); Lief I. Solberg et al., Is Integration in Large 
Medical Groups Associated with Quality?, 15 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e34, e40 (2009) (“This 
demonstration of a relationship between integration and quality provides support for encouragement 
of integration.”). 
142. Gregory C. Pope & Russel T. Burge, Inefficiencies in Physician Practices, in ADVANCES IN 
HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 129 (Richard M. Scheffler & Louis F. 
Rossiter eds., 1992); Burns et al., supra note 111, at 56–57; Lawton R. Burns et al., The Financial 
Performance of Integrated Health Organizations, J. HEALTHCARE MGMT., May/June 2005, at 191, 
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Scope economies allow for a decline in the average cost of production 
because of integration of shared resources.
143
 Units of production 
increase while costs decrease. In the health care setting, this may include 
such things as electronic medical records or a single management 
structure. Scope inefficiencies may include situations when the multi-
practice groups within a single practice do not work efficiently.
144
 
d. Managerial Diseconomies 
As more and more physician groups are brought within the hospital’s 
control, efficient management of the total operation becomes 
increasingly difficult. We refer to this problem as “managerial 
diseconomies.”145 Eventually, the additional costs of trying to coordinate 
one more stage of production will exceed the transaction cost savings 
that result from internalizing this additional stage. 
Because transaction costs are associated with all real-world markets, 
the economic incentive to integrate may well be pervasive to address 
real market concerns and to create efficiencies. Yet, as we pointed out 
earlier, all firms, including hospitals, do continue to use some 
intermediate services markets. No hospital owns all of the physician 
inputs that it uses in the production of its health care services.
146
 The 
reason for this lack of complete integration is that vertical integration 
itself tends to increase the firm’s costs. Expanding the hospital’s 
operations through additional physician group acquisition increases the 
problems of coordinating all the hospital’s activities. At that point, the 
hospital will refrain from further vertical integration and will make use 
                                                     
191 (“Results from a study of 36 large integrated health organizations (IHOs) suggest that financial 
performance is adversely affected by the scale of investment in integration . . . .”); José J. Escarce & 
Mark V. Pauly, Physician Opportunity Costs in Physician Practice Cost Functions, 17 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 129 (1998) (theorizing on economies and diseconomies of scale); Jeff Goldsmith, Integrating 
Care: A Talk with Kaiser Permanente’s David Lawrence, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2002, at 39, 39 
(“Hospitals ended up not dealing with some of the basic things that have to happen for an integrated 
system to work right”); Weil, supra note 140 (finding that multispecialty practices with fifty-one or 
more doctors are less efficient). 
143. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scale in Multi-Output Production, 91 Q.J. 
ECON. 481 (1977). 
144. R. Rosenman & D. Friesner, Scope and Scale Inefficiencies in Physician Practices, 13 
HEALTH ECON. 1091 (2004) (finding that multi-specialty groups are less efficient than single 
specialty groups); Sisira Sarma et al., Physician’s Production of Primary Care in Ontario, Canada, 
19 HEALTH ECON. 14, 27 (2010) (finding scale economies in Canada). 
145. For another application, see Francisco Brahm & Jorge Tarziján, The Impact of Complexity 
and Managerial Diseconomies on Hierarchical Governance, 84 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 586 
(2012). 
146. See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 123, at 6–10. 
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of the intermediate services market for the allocation of this input. 
Thus, while transaction costs provide a major incentive to vertically 
integrate, managerial diseconomies place a limit on the extent to which 
such integration will occur.
147
 Consequently, the extent of vertical 
integration (the number of production stages brought within the 
hospital’s control) is determined where the incremental cost of 
internalization equals or exceeds the incremental cost of market 
exchange. By expanding the firm’s breadth of operations to this point, 
the overall costs of producing and delivering the final product to the 
consumer are minimized. The optimal mix of internal and market 
exchange is selected, and the expanse of the hospital’s activities is 
determined. 
Where vertical integration—via either internal expansion or merger—
occurs in response to the presence of transaction costs, total welfare is 
improved by such integration.
148
 Cost reductions that do not themselves 
lead to any increase in market power will result in price reductions for 
final product consumers.
149
 Both producers and consumers can be made 
better off—profits can increase even as final output price falls by 
avoiding the costs of using the market mechanism. Consequently, 
antitrust policy should do nothing to discourage vertical integration 
under these circumstances.
150
 
Overall, the literature on transaction cost economics explains the 
motivations for integration via contract and merger. TCE has profound 
implications on antitrust merger policy
151
 and in particular on analysis of 
health care mergers between hospitals and physician groups. The lack of 
rigorous analysis of this in St. Luke’s is a missed opportunity to provide 
                                                     
147. Id. 
148. Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic 
Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1314–16 (2013). 
149. On the limits of vertical integration in such circumstances, see Janusz A. Ordover et al., 
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan, 
Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1232 (1998). 
150. Indeed, many of the problems regarding health care competition are a function of bad 
regulatory design rather than private restraints of trade. See generally David L. Meyer & Charles F. 
(Rick) Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 169, 179 (1994) (“In health care, moreover, apparent imperfections in the 
functioning of market competition largely can be attributed to distortions caused by government 
intervention and the historical bias against competition in the field.”). Specific to health care 
mergers involving physician group acquisitions, a physician will receive higher reimbursement rates 
for outpatient care that is delivered by an “integrated” system. See Burns et al., supra note 111, at 
68; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 24, at 1072. 
151. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Bryan Keating, Antitrust, Transaction Costs, and Merger 
Simulation with Nonlinear Pricing, 58 J.L. & ECON. 268 (2015). 
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sophisticated analysis and clarity for future mergers and integration short 
of mergers. 
II. FORECLOSURE 
A. Foreclosure Claim 
Physicians in an integrated hospital may refer patients to their own 
hospital
152
 through foreclosure.
153
 When a hospital acquires a large 
multi-specialty physician practice, the impact on rival hospitals in the 
local market can be substantial.
154
 Since the physicians of the acquired 
practices now are employed by the hospital, they will presumably refer 
all of their patients to their new hospital. In other words, the acquisition 
forecloses the rival hospital from these patients. In order to compete, the 
rival hospitals would have to be sufficiently more attractive to induce the 
patients to switch physicians. This, of course, may be possible for some 
patients but certainly not for all of them. The court in St. Luke’s did not 
properly understand the argument regarding foreclosure. A better 
understanding of this argument would have led to improved case law 
analysis not merely for this case but for its precedential value. 
B. Economic Rationale 
As one might expect, the acquisition generates mutual benefits for the 
hospital and the practice group. Physicians are largely responsible for 
selecting the hospital for their patients. Each referral confers a benefit on 
the hospital that can be measured by the increased contribution margin. 
                                                     
152. Ann S. O’Malley et al., Rising Hospital Employment of Physicians: Better Quality, Higher 
Costs?, ISSUE BRIEF (Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Wash. D.C.), Aug. 2011, 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1230 [https://perma.cc/2QV4-FVDA] (providing theoretical 
concern); Laurence C. Baker et al., The Effect of Hospital/Physician Integration on Hospital Choice 
17 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21497, 2015), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21497 [https://perma.cc/22M6-4AHA] (“We find that a hospital’s 
ownership of an admitting physician dramatically increases the probability that the physician’s 
patients will choose the owning hospital. We also find that ownership of an admitting physician has 
large effects on how the hospital’s cost and quality affect patients’ hospital choice. Patients whose 
admitting physician is not owned by a hospital are more likely to choose facilities that are low cost 
and high quality. . . . By contrast, patients are more likely to choose a high-cost, low-quality hospital 
when their admitting physician’s practice is owned by that hospital.”).  
153. Ordover et al., supra note 149; Richard S. Higgins, Competitive Vertical Foreclosure, 20 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 229 (1999). 
154. Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, FTC, Address at the Fifth National 
Accountable Care Organization Summit: Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Proscription, Not 
Prescription 8 (June 19, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
409481/140619_aco_speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7YA-FZL4]. 
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By acquiring a physician’s practice group, the hospital is essentially 
buying those referrals. The physicians also benefit because the price that 
is negotiated includes the capitalized value of the incremental 
contribution margin.
155
 There is no way for a hospital to pay for referrals 
due to anti-kickback rules.
156
 If a practice group is acquired, however, 
the hospital can “pay” the physicians by including a premium in the 
acquisition price.
157
 
The private plaintiffs in St. Luke’s offered a vertical foreclosure 
theory that involved referrals from the Saltzer group physicians drying 
up (relative to pre-merger) for their own inpatient admissions post-
merger.
158
 This meant that the channel for distribution of inpatient 
admissions would be foreclosed. The district court noted that prior 
practice at St. Luke’s suggested a history of foreclosure.159 The court 
explained, based on the testimony of Professor Haas-Wilson, that 
“[a]fter St. Luke’s purchased five specialty practices, ‘their business at 
Saint Alphonsus Boise dropped dramatically[, and] the amount of 
business that they did at St. Luke’s facilities increased dramatically.’”160 
The court suggested that such a practice was likely to be replicated.
161
 
On appeal, there was no discussion of this issue, even though the 
implications of such foreclosure permeated the facts and needed to be 
addressed. 
The economic reality is that in a world of price caps for certain 
hospital services, firms will attempt to increase the bottom line by 
increasing the total provision of hospital services. Given anti-steering 
                                                     
155. The contribution margin is the difference between the incremental revenue and the 
incremental cost. It is a measure of the incremental profit resulting from the added referrals. 
156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012); Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Honest Services, and 
Health Care Fraud After Skilling, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 137 (2012). 
157. This same phenomenon occurs in hospital acquisitions of other hospitals. See Regina E. 
Herzlinger et al., Market-Based Solutions to Antitrust Threats — The Rejection of the Partners 
Settlement, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1287 (2015). 
158. Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Damages, supra note 32. 
159. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV-00560-
BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *13 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 
(9th Cir. 2015).  
160. Id. 
161. Id. A related theory would be a raising rival’s cost theory regarding the vertical effects of the 
merger that would not cause exit from the market but merely raise costs for rivals. See Steven C. 
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983). Using the 
regulatory system as such a strategy, as through higher reimbursement rates, makes it more difficult 
for other physician groups to compete because of the lack of referrals sent to them. See Steven C. 
Salop et al., A Bidding Analysis of Special Interest Regulation: Raising Rivals’ Costs in a Rent 
Seeking Society, in FTC LAW & ECON. CONFERENCE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: 
PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 102 (1984). 
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rules, the best way to increase the total provision of services is through 
“buying” referrals.162 As long as the hospital has some unfilled beds, it 
can increase its total profits by filling them. One way to do this is by 
using referrals. The difference between the hospital’s charges and the 
marginal cost of an additional patient will flow to the bottom line as 
additional profit. This business strategy has the consequence of 
foreclosing competition by favoring in-network providers over out-of-
network providers. 
III. THE ECONOMICS OF THE HORIZONTAL CASE 
In a horizontal merger case, the antitrust concern rests with the 
following two issues: “A merger can enhance market power simply by 
eliminating competition between the merging parties . . . . A merger also 
can enhance market power by increasing the risk of coordinated, 
accommodating, or interdependent behavior among rivals.”163 In St. 
Luke’s, the horizontal case focused on a number of the traditional 
competitive effects elements, as embodied in the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines.
164
 We address those issues below, positing that a more 
sophisticated analysis by the courts would have led to better guidance in 
line with economic theory. The horizontal case would have been 
stronger had St. Luke’s properly understood the quality-based arguments 
and how quality and cost work within the same merger. 
A. Countervailing Power in Health Care 
From the horizontal perspective (as well as from a vertical one), 
physician acquisitions implicate negotiating power between providers 
and insurers. It is precisely to obtain the benefits of increased negotiating 
leverage that motivates many hospitals (and physician groups) to merge 
to obtain countervailing power over insurance providers and improve 
hospital bargaining position vis-à-vis insurers.
165
 This Section lays out 
                                                     
162. One might also attempt a related strategy. Because of the politics of pricing certain specialty 
services too high, hospitals might engage in spreading out the cost in what is the competitive 
(commoditized) services thereby raising the prices of these services because of the anti-competitive 
cross subsidization. 
163. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 1. 
164. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 783–92 (9th Cir. 2015).  
165. Peter P. Budetti et al., Physician and Health System Integration, 21 HEALTH AFF. 203 
(2002); Michael A. Morrisey et al., Managed Care and Physician/Hospital Integration, 15 HEALTH 
AFF. 62 (1996); Douglas A. Staiger et al., Trends in the Work Hours of Physicians in the United 
States, 303 JAMA 747 (2010). 
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the arguments associated with such countervailing power.
166
 Indeed, 
such an argument was a basis to justify the St. Luke’s merger.167 Adult 
primary care physician reimbursement rates with insurers received 
treatment in two short paragraphs on appeal.
168
 
In some geographic markets, dominant health insurers appear to have 
some measure of monopsony power (enhanced market power of buyers) 
in dealing with fragmented health care providers.
169
 The exercise of 
monopsony power by health insurers increases their profits at the 
expense of the health care providers.
170
 If the unorganized health care 
providers (physicians or nurses) or hospitals can consolidate their 
operations, they can create countervailing power, i.e., power on the other 
side of the market. In doing so, the market structure becomes one with 
elements of bilateral monopoly.
171
 Interestingly, the creation of 
countervailing monopoly power in the face of a lawful monopsony 
reduces the allocative inefficiency resulting from the exercise of 
monopsony power. This may seem counterintuitive, but it is correct 
nonetheless. These results can be illustrated with a simple economic 
model. 
1. The Economics of Countervailing Power 
The basic economic model of countervailing power is illustrated in 
                                                     
166. See generally David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Buyers’ Strategies, Entry Barriers 
and Competition, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 418 (1992). 
167. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV-00560-
BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *12 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 
(9th Cir. 2015) (“The leverage gained by the Acquisition would give St. Luke’s the ability to make 
these higher rates ‘stick’ in future contract negotiations.”).  
168. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786–87. 
169. For a compact treatment of the economics of monopsony, see Roger D. Blair & Christina 
DePasquale, Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy, in 1 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 364; Roger D. Blair & 
Christine Piette Durrance, Group Purchasing Organizations, Monopsony, and Antitrust Policy, 35 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 433 (2014). 
170. For an examination involving physicians, see Roger D. Blair & Kristine L. Coffin, Physician 
Collective Bargaining: State Legislation, and the State Action Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1731 
(2005); Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ventures: An 
Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989 (2004). 
171. The economics of bilateral monopoly can be traced to A.L. Bowley, Bilateral Monopoly, 38 
ECON. J. 651 (1928). See also Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral 
Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and 
the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 492–96 (2012); Richard 
Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 873; Fritz Machlup & 
Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 
101 (1960). In the health context, see Blair & Coffin, supra note 170, and Blair & Herndon, supra 
note 170.  
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Figure 1. The demand for health services is captured by the negatively 
sloped line D while the supply is represented by S. If the market were 
competitive, Q1 units of health services would be purchased at P1 per 
unit. This competitive solution maximizes social or total welfare, which 
is the sum of consumer and producer surplus. If a dominant health 
insurer purchases the health services, profit maximization will lead to a 
restriction in the quantity purchased. For the monopsonist, profit 
maximization requires purchasing the quantity where the marginal 
expenditure on health care services (ME) equals demand.
172
 This means 
that the quantity purchased will fall to Q2 and price will fall to P2. The 
exercise of monopsony power converts some producer surplus into 
consumer (or buyer) surplus. From a social welfare perspective, this is 
just a transfer from producers of health care services to the health 
insurers. When quantity falls from Q1 to Q2, we can see that the value of 
health care services between Q1 and Q2, as measured by the height of 
demand, exceed their cost as measured by the height of supply. Thus, 
there is an allocative inefficiency (area deb) associated with 
monopsony—even a lawful one. 
 
 
Figure 1 
                                                     
172. One can understand this via a technical proof. We provide a description instead in the text.  
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The loss of producer surplus provides a powerful incentive for health 
care providers to consolidate. In doing so, they become a monopolist. 
The market structure becomes one of bilateral monopoly: a monopolist 
supplier confronting a monopsonist buyer. A change in the market 
structure from monopsony to bilateral monopoly is procompetitive. The 
output will increase from the noncompetitive level (Q2) to the 
competitive level (Q1), i.e., bargaining will lead to the surplus-
maximizing output. This eliminates the allocative inefficiency and the 
corresponding deadweight total welfare loss. 
In a bilateral monopoly, the two parties have an incentive to agree on 
the surplus-maximizing quantity and then bargain over the price. In this 
context, the price is not a rationing device; after all, the quantity has 
already been agreed upon. Instead, the price is simply a mechanism for 
sharing the jointly maximized surplus. Consequently, the price is 
indeterminate. We can bound the price range by considering the all-or-
none demand (DA) and the all-or-none supply (SA). 
At quantity Q1, the height of the all-or-none demand is the maximum 
price (P3) the monopolist can command. At that price, all of consumer 
surplus has been extracted. Analogously, at Q1, the height of the all-or-
none supply is the lowest price since that price (P4) allows the 
monopsonist to extract the entire producer surplus. These maximum and 
minimum prices set the bargaining range. The competitive price is in 
that range, but there is nothing that particularly recommends that price as 
a solution.
173
 
Although the actual price is indeterminate, there are some likely price 
effects. If competing sellers merge in response to monopsony, the price 
is apt to rise above P2—because the firms merged in pursuit of a better 
deal. These price movements, however, have no competitive 
significance since quantity does not respond to such price changes. The 
price movement does have distributive consequences, but these have no 
impact on total welfare. 
The Ninth Circuit examined two related issues involving the 
possibility of bilateral monopoly in St. Luke’s.174 The first involved adult 
primary care physician provider reimbursements. Though noting that the 
district court had found that the “acquisition limited the ability of 
insurers to negotiate with the merged entity,” the Ninth Circuit merely 
                                                     
173. In this specific example, the competitive price divides the surplus evenly, which is consistent 
with the Nash bargaining solution.  
174. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 786–87 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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summarized that the lower court did not find that any price decreases 
would be passed onto consumers.
175
 
B. Role of Efficiencies 
Horizontal merger studies of hospitals show that efficiency gains are 
possible.
176
 For example, Dranove and Lindrooth find efficiencies in cost 
decreases of fourteen percent for standalone hospitals integrated into 
hospital systems.
177
 Other mergers may lack efficiencies and may serve 
to raise prices.
178
 
Post-ACA there has been a trend toward vertical integration of 
physician groups into hospitals. According to Kocher and Sahni, more 
than half of all physicians are now employed by hospitals.
179
 The 
combination of a hospital and one or more physician groups is 
sometimes referred to as an integrated delivery system (IDS). Such IDSs 
should theoretically lower costs because they can more easily coordinate 
care, improve communication among providers, reduce unnecessary 
duplication of tests and procedures, and generate other efficiencies.
180
 
When a hospital first acquires a physician group, the acquisition is 
vertical in nature. The hospital is acquiring inputs it requires in the 
production of health care services. The ideas about reduced transactions 
costs and other efficiencies achieved through vertical integration 
described earlier apply to this case. Once the hospital is already 
established as an IDS, then subsequent acquisitions of physician groups 
continue to be vertical in nature. However, they also now have elements 
of horizontal integration as the IDS, which is already comprised of 
physician groups, continues to acquire additional physician groups. 
The effects of vertical versus horizontal integration may be different. 
                                                     
175. Id. 
176. David Dranove & Richard Lindrooth, Hospital Consolidation and Costs: Another Look at 
the Evidence, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 983 (2003). But see Teresa D. Harrison, Do Mergers Really 
Reduce Costs? Evidence from Hospitals, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 1054 (2011) (finding that costs 
declined but then rose to pre-merger levels). 
177. Dranove & Lindrooth, supra note 176, at 983 (“Mergers in which hospitals consolidate 
financial reporting and licenses generate savings of approximately 14%: 2, 3, and 4 years after 
merger.”). 
178. Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the 
Hospital Industry, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 172, 174, 195 (2015) (finding a 30.5% price increase in the 
FTC challenge against the Inova merger). 
179. Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians – The Logic 
Behind a Money-Losing Proposition, NEW ENG. J. MED., May 12, 2011, at 1790, 1790. 
180. Wenke Hwang et al., Effects of Integrated Delivery System on Cost and Quality, 19 AM. J. 
MANAGED CARE e175 (2013). 
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First, prices may be reduced through transactions cost savings generated 
through vertical integration. Second, prices may increase through the 
impact of tied purchasing through vertical integration. In other words, 
prices could be affected through the bundling of physician and hospital 
services. Finally, prices could be positively affected if the horizontal 
integration that occurs reduces the number of competitors and/or creates 
market power. 
The potential for efficiencies exists in both the horizontal integration 
of physician groups as well as in the vertical integration of physician 
groups with hospitals. Rationales for integration among physicians into 
physician groups include: 
[C]reating modern practice infrastructure such as information 
technology (IT) and revenue cycle enhancement, enhancing 
operating efficiency, creating negotiating leverage, relieving 
physicians of administrative duties, income preservation, 
improving quality, increasing scale to manage risk contracts, 
improving the ability to coordinate care and referrals, 
positioning to serve as an ACO under health reform, fostering 
physician leadership, supporting population health, and 
improved ability to manage an uncertain and turbulent 
environment.
181
 
Physician and physician groups may also face incentives to integrate 
with hospitals. These rationales include: 
[P]reparing for global risk contracting or capitation (e.g., by 
incorporating PCPs into hospital networks), increasing network 
size and geographic coverage to handle risk contracting, taking 
responsibility for the health status of the local population, 
offering a seamless continuum of care, responding to federal and 
state health reform legislation, and protecting and expanding the 
supply of physicians.
182
 
These are not the only rationales. Additionally: 
During the 2000s, some additional rationales were added: 
mitigating competition between hospitals and their medical 
staffs, sharing the cost of clinical IT with physicians, helping 
physicians stabilize their incomes and supporting malpractice 
expenses, increasing the predictability of the physician’s 
caseload with a desire to improve care, developing regional 
service lines, creating entry barriers to key clinical services, 
                                                     
181. Burns et al., supra note 111, at 56. 
182. Id. at 67. 
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helping hospitals deal with physician shortages and recruitment 
needs, developing a branding and differentiation strategy, 
enhancing clinical quality, leveraging payers, and preparing for 
ACOs . . . .
183
 
These rationales for integration suggest that there are some pro-
competitive reasons for potential merger efficiencies that courts should 
weigh as part of their analysis. 
Some literature has tested these hypotheses directly. Baker, Bundorf, 
and Kessler investigated the effects of vertical integration in health care 
on hospital pricing power.
184
 Using hospital claims data for non-elderly, 
privately-insured patients, the authors constructed county-level indices 
of hospital prices (as well as volumes of hospital admissions and 
spending) and tested the effects of vertical integration on these 
outcomes.
185
 The results suggested that fully vertically integrated 
hospitals were associated with higher hospital prices, which the authors 
interpreted as confirming the hypothesis that vertical integration led to 
increased hospital market power.
186
 
In a recent working paper, Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler analyze the 
relationship between hospital ownership of physician practices and 
hospital choice by the patient.
187
 Using hospital admission data for 
Medicare recipients, the authors find an increased probability that the 
admitting physician refers a patient to the hospital that owns the 
physician group, thereby creating an implicit payment for referral.
188
 
Additionally, their study raises concerns about whether or not this 
increased probability results in patients choosing higher cost and lower 
quality hospitals when the physician group is owned by the hospital.
189
 
In a series of papers, Carlin, Dowd, and Feldman also tested these 
hypotheses, but were able to specifically test the effects of horizontal 
integration as distinct from vertical integration.
190
 They hypothesized 
                                                     
183. Id. at 67–68. 
184. Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is 
Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 HEALTH AFF. 756 (2014). 
185. Id. at 756. 
186. Id. at 762. 
187. Baker et al., supra note 152. 
188. Id. at 17. 
189. Id.  
190. Caroline S. Carlin et al., Changes in Quality of Health Care Delivery After Vertical 
Integration, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1043 (2015) [hereinafter Carlin et al., Changes]; Carlin et al., 
supra note 21; Caroline S. Carlin et al., The Impact of Provider Consolidation on Price: Horizontal 
Integration and Tied Purchasing (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://conference.nber.org/ 
confer//2013/HOPf13/Carlin_Feldman_Dowd.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD6R-G4YK] [hereinafter 
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that further horizontal integration between newly acquired physician 
groups and already-acquired physician groups may lead to higher prices 
because of increased market power, as it reduces the amount of 
competition in the market for physician services.
191
 They further 
hypothesized that vertical integration between the hospital and physician 
groups may lead to higher or lower prices depending on the respective 
effects of tied contracting or bundling of physician and hospital services 
(positive) and transaction costs (negative).
192
 Using a unique setting 
where three multi-specialty physician clinics were acquired by two 
hospital IDSs, the authors tested the effects of IDS acquisition of 
physician groups (which, in their setting, necessarily includes aspects of 
both vertical and horizontal integration) on physician and hospital 
prices.
193
 They found evidence supportive of the market power 
hypothesis, where physician prices increased, and some evidence 
supportive of the tied contracting hypothesis, where hospital prices 
increased.
194
 
Carlin, Dowd, and Feldman used the same data and acquisition setting 
to test two other relevant questions. They examined the effect of 
provider consolidation first on health care quality
195
 and second on 
physician referral patterns.
196
 Using cancer screening rates and ER use as 
indicators of health care quality, the authors found small positive effects 
on health care quality, suggesting limited increases in quality of care 
measures.
197
 Additionally, when studying the effect of integration on 
physician referral patterns, the authors found some reduction in the use 
of historically-selected facilities and some increase in the use of the 
acquiring IDS facilities.
198
 
Vertical integration in the hospital setting has yielded mixed 
empirical results. While some studies find efficiencies in limited 
settings,
199
 others find an increase in prices,
200
 and yet others find little 
                                                     
Carlin et al., Impact of Provider Consolidation on Price]. 
191. Carlin et al., Impact of Provider Consolidation on Price, supra note 190, at 3. 
192. Id. at 2–3. 
193. Id. at 1. 
194. Id. at 14. 
195. Carlin et al., Changes, supra note 190.  
196. Carlin et al., supra note 21. 
197. Carlin et al., Changes, supra note 190, at 1048, 1065. 
198. Carlin et al., supra note 21, at 1. 
199. Federico Ciliberto & David Dranove, The Effect of Physician-Hospital Affiliations on 
Hospital Prices in California, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 29, 37 (2006). 
200. Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, How the Expansion of Hospital Systems Has 
Affected Consumers, 24 HEALTH AFF. 213, 217 (2005).  
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effect on total welfare.
201
 There has been scant actual empirical evidence 
indicating that merger efficiencies can overcome the anticompetitive 
effects created by mergers.
202
 Most prior work has been unable to 
investigate this specific question because of a lack of data on how 
mergers ultimately affect variable and marginal costs. A recent paper by 
Ashenfelter, Hoskin, and Weinberg, however, had sufficient data to test 
both the anticompetitive effects of a merger, as well as the potential 
merger efficiencies that result.
203
 The authors examined a merger 
between two firms in the brewing industry, Coors and Miller, and found 
that “[o]n net, we find that despite reducing the number of macrobrewers 
from three to two, efficiencies created by the merger offset the incentive 
to increase prices in the average regional market in the long run.”204 At 
least in their specific case study, the authors showed it is possible for 
efficiencies to offset price increases resulting from a merger.
205
 
Overall, both the district and appeals court in St. Luke’s ignored the 
empirical analysis of physician group acquisitions. Further, a robust 
discussion of efficiencies was lacking in the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, the 
court explained, “We remain skeptical about the efficiencies defense in 
general and about its scope in particular.”206 Such mistrust of efficiencies 
that relies on outdated United States Supreme Court cases from the 
1960s
207
 and ignores the acceptance of efficiencies in other circuits 
where efficiencies have been addressed
208
 is disappointing, regardless of 
whether or not the efficiencies in St. Luke’s could have saved the 
merger. In order to explain efficiencies in the merger context, below we 
lay out the economics of merger efficiencies as well as a case analysis of 
the treatment of efficiencies by prior courts in the hospital merger 
                                                     
201. Robert S. Huckman, Hospital Integration and Vertical Consolidation: An Analysis of 
Acquisitions in New York State, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 58, 58 (2006). 
202. Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., Efficiencies Brewed: Pricing and Consolidation in the US Beer 
Industry, 46 RAND J. ECON. 328, 328–29 (2015). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 330. 
205. Id. at 352; see also Dario Focarelli & Fabio Panetta, Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? 
Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1152 (2003) (finding that 
efficiencies outweigh market power effects in the banking merger context). 
206. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 790 (9th Cir. 2015). 
207. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
208. See, e.g., ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 571 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. 
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 
1045, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222–24 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
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setting. 
C. Economics of Efficiency-Enhancing Mergers 
In this Section we lay out the economics of efficiency-enhancing 
mergers. We do so to set up the discussion of efficiencies in the St. 
Luke’s decision in the next section. To properly set up the case-specific 
efficiency discussion, we begin with first principles. Mergers among 
health care providers may yield efficiencies due to cost reductions or due 
to quality enhancement. In either case, total welfare may increase or 
decrease depending upon how much the merger alters market structure. 
This Section analyzes cost-based efficiencies, efficiency-enhancing joint 
ventures among sellers and buyers, and quality-based efficiencies. 
1. Cost-Based Efficiencies 
There are some instances in which a merger improves efficiency, for 
example by reducing the costs of production and/or distribution.
209
 If the 
merger does not enhance market power, the cost savings will be passed 
on to some extent to consumers in the form of lower prices.
210
 In this 
case, because both consumer welfare and total welfare are increased by 
the merger, the antitrust policy should be one of benign neglect.
211
 In 
some instances, however, the improved efficiency is accompanied by 
enhanced market power, as Williamson noted in his famous exposition 
on the efficiency trade-off.
212
 This may still result in greater output and 
lower prices and, therefore, would increase both consumer welfare and 
total welfare. The complication arises when there is a cost reduction due 
to the efficiency accompanied by an increase in market power that leads 
to a price increase above the previous level. This situation creates a need 
to weigh the benefits of improved efficiency against the costs of 
allocative inefficiency. The antitrust problem addressed by Williamson 
provides a good illustration of the required balancing.
213
 The same 
analysis applies to all joint ventures and agreements that are necessary to 
realize the efficiency. 
                                                     
209. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 10. 
210. In the extreme case, where the market is perfectly competitive, the firm will not pass on any 
firm-specific efficiency.  
211. Under certain circumstances, there may be a difference in outcomes as to efficiencies as 
between total welfare and consumer welfare tests. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 171, at 482–87. 
212. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
213. See id. 
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2. Efficiency-Enhancing Joint Ventures and Mergers Among Sellers 
The case analyzed by Williamson illustrates the complications that 
may accompany efficiency-enhancing agreements, joint ventures, and 
horizontal mergers.
214
 In Figure 2, the pre-agreement price and quantity, 
P1 and Q1, respectively, are determined by the equality of demand (D) 
and the competitive supply, which is shown as MC1 = AC1. The analysis 
assumes that industry marginal cost (MC1) and average cost (AC1) are 
constant. The merger increases efficiency as reflected in the decrease in 
costs from MC1 = AC1 to MC2 = AC2. If market power does not increase 
as a result of the merger, the cost savings will be passed on to 
consumers.
215
 The price will fall to P2 and the quantity consumed will 
rise from Q1 to Q2. In this case, the merger raises no antitrust policy 
concerns since the welfare effects are unambiguously positive: both 
consumer welfare and total welfare increase. 
Complications arise when market power increases due to an 
efficiency-enhancing merger. In Figure 2, suppose that the merger leads 
to the same cost savings, but that the exercise of the resulting market 
power leads to an increase in price from P1 to P3 with a corresponding 
decrease in quantity from Q1 to Q3. From the consumer’s perspective, the 
merger appears to be clearly undesirable. The price paid rises, and the 
consumer does not appear to enjoy any of the benefits from the cost 
reduction. The allocative inefficiency flowing from the exercise of 
market power causes consumer surplus to fall from area acP1 to area 
abP3. If the lawfulness of the merger is determined solely on the basis of 
consumer welfare in this market, it would be unlawful. 
                                                     
214. William M. Landes addresses a similar problem when a horizontal price fixing cartel 
reduces transaction costs while increasing price. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for 
Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983). 
215. Due to the perfectly elastic competitive supply curve, all of the cost saving is passed on to 
consumers when the market remains competitive. If the supply were positively-sloped, not all of the 
cost saving would be passed on, but output would still rise and price would still fall. 
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Figure 2 
 
If one looks at this merger from a total welfare perspective, there are 
two important observations worth making. First, whether total welfare 
rises or falls depends on the relative magnitudes of the allocative 
inefficiency and the cost savings. In Figure 2, the allocative inefficiency 
is given by the triangular area bcd. The profit to the sellers is equal to the 
rectangle P3beP2. Part of this, area P3bdP1, is a transfer from consumers 
to producers and part of it represents the cost savings. Specifically, the 
cost savings is given by the rectangle P1deP2. As Figure 2 is drawn, the 
cost savings appears to be larger than the allocative inefficiency. In that 
event, the merger should not be barred on total welfare grounds because 
the benefits of the cost saving outweigh the allocative inefficiency. The 
merger is Kaldor-Hicks efficient because the winners (the producers) 
could compensate the losers (the consumers) and still be better off.
216
 
But this need not always be the case. When the allocative inefficiency 
outweighs the cost saving, the merger reduces both consumer welfare 
and total welfare. The merger is inefficient on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
because the winners cannot profitably compensate the losers. Such a 
merger should be forbidden. Since we cannot presume that the net effect 
                                                     
216. For a discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC 
APPROACH TO LAW 1–7 (2d ed. 2009). For a more extensive treatment, see RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., 
THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 32–38 (2004). 
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of an efficiency-enhancing agreement among rival sellers will inevitably 
be positive or negative, we need reliable estimates of the cost savings as 
well as of the allocative inefficiency. This is particularly daunting for 
proposed mergers because both estimates are needed before the merger 
is actually consummated. 
Merger simulations have proved useful in many instances,
217
 though 
they do not appear to be well-equipped to deal with the problem at 
hand.
218
 The typical merger simulation does predict price effects before a 
merger has actually occurred. These simulations, however, use estimated 
demand elasticities and assumptions about the conduct of the firms to 
back out calculations of a firm’s marginal cost. This makes it difficult to 
incorporate the cost savings and measure the potential allocative 
inefficiency. It is difficult for the analyst to estimate the cost savings a 
merged firm is apt to realize without very detailed cost data and very 
specialized institutional knowledge. Without specific cost estimates, 
merger simulation does not address the effect of efficiency. Moreover, 
estimating the potential allocative inefficiency is complicated by the fact 
that a firm’s post-merger conduct may differ substantially from its pre-
merger conduct. Consequently, it is doubtful that merger simulations are 
the answer. 
Further, even if one’s focus is solely on consumer welfare, the cost 
savings benefit consumers generally. These cost savings do, of course, 
improve the profits of the sellers in this market. But it would be a 
mistake to dismiss these cost savings as of no consequence to 
consumers.
219
 The sellers’ costs fall because fewer of society’s scarce 
resources are needed to produce the output being sold.
220
 These 
resources are then available to produce goods and services in other 
markets. The consumer benefits flowing from these cost savings may be 
diffused throughout the economy, but they exist nonetheless. 
Below we offer some numerical examples of the potential efficiency 
gains of a merger: 
Assume the demand curve written as 
𝑃 = 500 − 0.5𝑄 
                                                     
217. See Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with 
New Applications, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 883 (2001) (explaining the use of merger simulation); see 
also 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 6.1. 
218. Dennis W. Carlton, The Relevance for Antitrust Policy of Theoretical and Empirical 
Advances in Industrial Organization, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 47, 61 (2003).  
219. We are not counting the cost savings twice. One may dismiss them as beneficial to the 
sellers, but they should be considered for their benefits to consumers. 
220. We are not referring to the resources not being used because output has been reduced from 
Q1 to Q3. We are instead referring to the resources now needed to produce Q3. 
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The constant marginal cost (MC) and average cost (AC) written as 
𝑀𝐶 =  𝐴𝐶 = 100 
500 − 0.5𝑄 = 100 
𝑄∗ = 800 
The pre-merger price P* is equal to the marginal cost, i.e., 
𝑃∗ = 100 
The resulting consumer surplus is 
  𝐶𝑆 = 1 2⁄ (500 − 100)(800) 
 = 160,000 
Following a merger, suppose that price rises to, say, 120. The quantity 
would then be 760. The deadweight total welfare loss would then be 
   ∆ =  1 2⁄ (120 − 100)(800 − 760) 
 = 1 2⁄ ((20)(40)) 
 = 400 
The minimum cost saving that would offset this welfare loss is easy 
to find:  
(100 − 𝑥)(760) = 400 
Thus, the decrease in MC and AC (∆𝐶) is  
 ∆𝐶 =
400
760
 
 = 0.53 
Contrary to the assertions of critics, efficiency gains that are rather 
modest can completely offset a substantial increase in price. In this 
example, a cost decrease of only $0.53 completely offsets the welfare 
loss associated with a price increase of $20. 
 
Consumer Welfare: 
 
The story is quite different if we focus on consumer surplus. The pre-
merger consumer surplus is 160,000. Following the merger and the 
consequent price increase, consumer surplus falls to  
 𝐶𝑆2  =  
1
2⁄ (500 − 120)(760) 
 = 144,400 
Thus, consumer welfare falls by 15,600. 
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Profits: 
 
Initially, the marginal cost was 10. Following the merger and the cost 
saving, the economic profit is  
∆𝜋 = (120 − 𝑀𝐶2)(760) 
The part attributable to the price rise is  
(120 − 100)(760) = 15,200 
The rest is due to the cost saving. 
If the cost saving must be large enough to offset the loss in consumer 
surplus, then the minimum cost saving is equal to the number that we 
calculated plus the price increase. This is because the conversion of 
consumer surplus to producer surplus is equal to the increase in price 
times the new quantity. Is this “extraordinary” for purposes of merger 
law? If so, then under the sliding scale, extraordinary efficiencies are not 
that “extraordinary” in size. 
3. Welfare Effects of Quality 
Quality issues are particularly difficult for courts to understand and 
work through in antitrust merger cases.
221
 Health care hospital mergers 
present particularly complex issues involving quality; the Ninth Circuit 
in St. Luke’s was no different in its weak analysis of quality competition 
and gave significantly less attention to quality concerns than it did to 
cost-based efficiencies.
222
 Below we explain the economics of quality 
before working through merger efficiencies more generally in case law 
along both cost and quality dimensions. Firms compete on quality in 
health care as fiercely as they may on price. Since the justification for a 
hospital merger may rest upon quality arguments, it is important to 
understand the welfare effects of quality mergers. 
Some mergers may improve the quality of the hospital’s output.223 
Irrespective of the welfare effects of the improved quality, neither the 
antitrust agencies
224
 nor the courts
225
 will recognize these benefits unless 
                                                     
221. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 1969, 1971 (2015). 
222. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2015). 
223. Quality is a general term that acquires meaning in specific context. It may refer to durability, 
fit and finish, style, color fastness, taste, texture, freedom from defects, and the like.  
224. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 10. 
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they are merger-specific. If the quality change can be realized without 
the consolidation, then the efficiencies will not offset any reduction in 
competition. Consequently, in what follows, the quality changes are 
assumed to be merger-specific, i.e., the quality improvement is a product 
of the merger and cannot be realized without the merger. 
Consumers prefer higher quality over lower quality goods and 
services. Thus, when quality improves, consumers are willing to pay 
more for the same quantity of the good. Initially, assume that improved 
quality leads to a parallel shift in demand for the good. The effect on 
consumer welfare is ambiguous. In fact, consumer surplus may rise, fall, 
or stay the same depending on what happens to price. 
In Figure 3, D1 represents demand before the merger and the 
corresponding quality improvement. The supply is not restricted by the 
marginal cost (MC). The pre-merger price and quantity are P1 and Q1, 
respectively. Following the merger, quality of the output improves and 
demand shifts to D2. If the price rises to P2, quantity will not change. In 
other words, none of the quality change is “passed on” so to speak. In 
this case, consumer surplus will be unchanged. Prior to the merger, 
consumer surplus was equal to the triangular area abP1. Following the 
merger, consumer surplus is equal to the area of cdP2. Those two 
triangular areas are precisely the same size. To be sure, the enhanced 
market power leads to some allocative inefficiency because consumer 
surplus would rise to ceP1 if the merger produced the quality 
improvement without enhancing market power. But this is not the 
relevant comparison because we assume that the quality improvement 
and the enhanced market power are inextricably intertwined. Based on 
this model, on economic grounds, therefore, there is no reason to 
approve or disapprove the merger. 
 
                                                     
225. See, e.g., FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2015); United States v. H 
& R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89–90 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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Figure 3 
 
In Figure 4, D1, D2, and MC from Figure 3 have been reproduced. In 
this case, however, assume that the increased market power leads to a 
price increase to P2, which leads to an increase in the quantity 
purchased. As long as quantity increases beyond Q1, consumer surplus 
will rise. The premerger consumer surplus is again equal to the area 
abP1. The post-merger consumer surplus is equal to area cdP2, which is 
unambiguously larger than abP1. If the merger is accompanied by an 
increase in market power, there will be some allocative inefficiency, but 
this is not relevant for antitrust policy purposes. What is important is that 
consumer surplus rises with the merger. On economic grounds, 
therefore, this merger should be applauded. 
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Figure 4 
 
In Figure 5, the merger enhances both quality and market power. 
Price rises to P2 and quantity falls to Q2. In this case, consumer surplus 
necessarily falls. The pre-merger consumer surplus is, of course, area 
abP1. The post-merger consumer surplus is area cdP2, which is 
unambiguously smaller than area abP1. Without more, this merger 
should not be approved on welfare grounds. 
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Figure 5 
 
In these three cases, the quality improvement associated with the 
merger led to the same shift in demand, but the welfare changes were 
driven by the extent of the increase in market power. No legitimate 
inferences can be drawn from the fact that the post-merger price rose. In 
the case of a parallel shift in demand, it is the quantity change that drives 
the welfare result. Thus, it is tempting to use a quantity test. If the post-
merger quantity will be higher, then the merger will improve consumer 
welfare. If the post-merger quantity will be lower, then the welfare effect 
will be negative. But such temptations should be avoided as such a 
quantity analysis will not necessarily tell us about what happens to 
consumer welfare. 
Consider Figure 6. In this case, the improved quality causes D1 to 
rotate to D3, which has been drawn to where it intersects D2 at the point 
defined by P2 and Q2. Now, the relevant comparison is between the pre-
merger consumer surplus of abP1 and the post-merger consumer surplus 
of cdP2, which may well be larger than abP1. Thus, there is no easy test 
unless one knows that the demand shift is parallel. 
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Figure 6 
 
These examples illustrate how changes in quality may lead to 
different competitive outcomes. Such illustrations therefore suggest that 
courts must undertake a careful and nuanced approach to understand the 
implications of merger efficiencies. As we discuss below, most 
horizontal merger cases that discuss efficiencies do not fully integrate 
the economic analysis into their decision-making (at least not in the text 
of the decision) and instead provide a cursory analysis. 
IV. THE LAW OF THE HORIZONTAL CASE 
The economics of the horizontal case must be operationalized into 
law. After all, it is the administrability of economic thought into law that 
is the modern hallmark of antitrust case analysis.
226
 This Part works 
through the judicial history of antitrust health care mergers and their 
analysis of efficiencies. The analysis of efficiencies in merger analysis 
shows an increasing willingness to identify where there may be 
                                                     
226. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant 
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13–14; William 
H. Page, Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury: Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 
ANTITRUST BULL. 909, 909–11 (1996). 
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efficiencies. However, analysis remains uneven as between cost and 
quality based efficiencies and with an understanding that both cost and 
quality may be at issue in the same merger. What remains an unsettled 
question of merger case law is the situation where prices go up but so 
does quality. 
A. Judicial History of Antitrust Mergers in Health Care—Overview 
A string of several court losses over eight years in the 1990s by 
antitrust agencies in hospital mergers impacted both case law 
development and policy.
227
 The cases used broader geographic markets 
than those alleged by the government and at times came up with 
different analyses relating to competitive effects than those alleged by 
the government antitrust enforcers. Consequently, the courts decided 
against the government antitrust enforcers in seven straight decisions.
228
 
The series of losses by the government had some difficult to measure 
effects. The sense within the practitioner community is that the losses 
emboldened potential merging parties to undertake acquisitions in some 
highly concentrated markets.
229
 
An FTC retrospective study undertaken under the leadership of 
Chairman Tim Muris focused on consummated mergers that might make 
good candidates for government merger enforcement (as the price 
effects post-merger would be known).
230
 The Commission found a case 
it deemed worth bringing in In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare 
Corp.,
231
 a post-consummated merger of Highland Park Hospital with 
                                                     
227. FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999);  FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 
F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995); FTC v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cty., 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. 
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d mem., 121 F.3d 708 (6th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as 
moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997); see also California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057 
(N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 
2001). 
228. Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, FTC, Keynote Remarks at the Clayton Act 100th Anniversary 
Symposium: The Clayton and FTC Acts: 100 Years of Looking Ahead 6 (Dec. 4, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/603341/mcsweeny_-_aba_clayton_ 
act_100th_keynote_12-04-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK4P-NGJB] (“Prior to Evanston, the FTC and 
DOJ had lost seven straight hospital merger challenges.”). 
229. Thomas L. Greaney, Commentary, Competition Policy After Health Care Reform: Mending 
Holes in Antitrust Law’s Protective Net, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 897, 898 (2015). 
230. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Remarks Before the 7th Annual Competition in Health 
Care Forum: Everything Old is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the 21st Century (Nov. 
7, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murishealthcarespeech0211.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JE6B-6NG6]. 
231. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1 (2007). 
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Evanston Hospital and Glenbrook Hospital.
232
 Together the merged 
entity became Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation. FTC 
brought an administrative complaint,
233
 and an ALJ found the merger to 
be anti-competitive,
234
 which the Commission affirmed.
235
 Evanston 
brought about a shift in the courts. Since that time, the government has 
won more cases, blocking hospital mergers
236
 and chilling potential 
mergers. We provide this background of health care antitrust mergers to 
offer context for a discussion of the development of efficiencies in 
antitrust merger case law. 
Antitrust doctrine shifted starting in the 1970s to take efficiencies 
seriously in both merger and conduct cases.
237
 The belief in efficiencies 
outweighing anti-competitive effects underscores the paradigm shift in 
antitrust that began in the 1970s. This belief both by the antitrust 
agencies and courts has continued to the present. Under current antitrust 
doctrine for both mergers and conduct, efficiencies are an integral part of 
antitrust. In the merger context, though efficiencies perhaps have not 
provided the sole justification for particular merger cases (though 
efficiencies should have carried the day for the parties in the case of 
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.,
238
 discussed below), efficiencies have been a 
staple of analysis of mergers in the various iterations of the Merger 
Guidelines, as we explore below, as well as in understanding the rule of 
reason more generally.
239
 The Ninth Circuit’s hostile reading of merger 
efficiencies in St. Luke’s also goes against the antitrust jurisprudence of 
the past thirty years.
240
 To be sure, efficiencies rarely come up in 
                                                     
232. Id. at 2–3.  
233. Id. at 1.  
234. Id. at 23 (finding that “Complaint Counsel proved that the challenged merger has 
substantially lessened competition in the product market of general acute inpatient services [sold to 
managed care organizations] and in the geographic market of the seven hospitals described above”). 
235. Id. at 1. 
236. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-
Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015); ProMedica 
Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 
2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Reading Health Sys., No. 9353 (F.T.C. Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/12/121207 
readingsircmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3423-WMRJ] (Order Dismissing Complaint); Inova Health 
Sys. Found., 145 F.T.C. 366 (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/ 
06/080617orderdismisscmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LZ8-4KK8] (Order Dismissing Complaint).  
237. Blair & Sokol, supra note 39, at 2515. 
238. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
239. See generally Kovacic, supra note 226. 
240. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10 (providing an overview); see also William J. Kolasky & 
Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of 
Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 235 (2003) (“This review of the case law shows that 
 
04 - Blair Durrance Sokol.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/27/2016  2:56 PM 
52 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1 
 
practice in terms of litigated cases, as we will explore below in greater 
detail.
241
 
B. Case Law Treatment of Merger Efficiencies 
Case law holds that efficiencies may be used to rebut a claim for 
preliminary injunction.
242
 Yet, both the district court and Ninth Circuit in 
St. Luke’s suffered from some fundamental problems of understanding 
the legal role of efficiencies in merger analysis. Unfortunately, the Ninth 
Circuit was hostile to efficiencies.
243
 
Efficiencies came into play as part of a procedural burden shift. First, 
the plaintiff needs to establish a prima facie case. Then, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to put forth evidence rebutting the alleged anti-
competitive effects of the merger. This burden-shifting approach was 
embodied in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.
244
 The Ninth Circuit 
began its efficiencies analysis with the statement that efficiencies are 
technically illegal under United States Supreme Court case law.
245
 The 
decision then expressed doubt that the efficiencies analysis overall
246
 is 
problematic. By framing merger efficiencies this way, the Ninth Circuit 
consciously devalued efficiencies in a way that is detrimental to how 
antitrust works in practice. 
In earlier jurisprudence, the Supreme Court was hostile to efficiency 
claims and even used efficiencies as a justification to challenge a merger 
because small, inefficient competitors could be harmed by the 
                                                     
the Merger Guidelines have been influential in shaping the courts’ approach to efficiencies, just as 
they have been in other areas. The courts have followed the agencies’ lead in accepting that 
efficiencies may be used, in appropriate circumstances, to rebut a prima facie case of illegality 
based on presumptions drawn from market shares and concentration ratios. The courts have also 
adopted the same basic analytical framework as the Guidelines, sometimes citing the Guidelines, 
but also often relying on the Areeda-Turner treatise, on which the current Guidelines approach is 
largely modeled.”). We note, however, that the current living author of the treatise, Herb 
Hovenkamp recently explained, “Although more empirical work needs to be done, what we have so 
far suggests that current merger policy if anything underestimates competitive harm, exaggerates 
passed-on efficiencies, or some combination of both.” Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger 
Efficiencies 29 (Sept. 27, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664266 
[https://perma.cc/VA7W-M696].  
241. FTC v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 72 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that “courts have 
rarely, if ever, denied a preliminary injunction solely based on the likely efficiencies”).  
242. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720. 
243. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015). 
244. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
245. Id. at 989–90. 
246. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791. 
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efficiencies.
247
 Technically still good case law, “[p]ossible economies 
cannot be used as a defense to illegality” under FTC v. Procter & 
Gamble Co.,
248
 a case where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
government, because the merger would reduce advertising costs.
249
 This 
reading of efficiencies merger law was upheld in the Ninth Circuit in 
1979 in RSR Corp. v. FTC.
250
 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not 
cleaned up these old cases, although all other circuits that have weighed 
in on merger efficiencies recognize their importance.
251
 
This framing of efficiencies as invalid as a defense to guide case law 
is important given the emphasis that the Ninth Circuit decision gave to 
its harsh language on efficiencies in the St. Luke’s case.252 This is not to 
suggest that efficiencies had no value until the 1980s. The 1968 DOJ 
Merger Guidelines allowed for a rather limited efficiencies defense.
253
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court began to recognize efficiencies in the 
conduct area starting in the late 1970s.
254
 
Nevertheless, only in the 1980s did merger case law shift to begin to 
acknowledge that efficiencies might serve as a possible “defense.”255 
The 1982
256
 and 1984
257
 Merger Guidelines also re-established 
efficiencies as a “defense.”258 Although the DOJ 1982 Guidelines 
                                                     
247. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see also United States v. Phila. Nat’l 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
248. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). 
249. Id. at 580 (arguing that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. 
Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but 
it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition”). 
250. 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979). 
251. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2057–67 (providing an overview of the case evolution). 
252.  Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015). 
253. 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 40, at 8 (“Unless there are exceptional 
circumstances, the Department will not accept as a justification for an acquisition normally subject 
to challenge under its horizontal merger standards the claim that the merger will produce economies 
(i.e., improvements in efficiency) because, among other reasons, (i) the Department’s adherence to 
the standards will usually result in no challenge being made to mergers of the kind most likely to 
involve companies operating significantly below the size necessary to achieve significant economies 
of scale; (ii) where substantial economies are potentially available to a firm, they can normally be 
realized through internal expansion; and (iii) there usually are severe difficulties in accurately 
establishing the existence and magnitude of economies claimed for a merger.” (emphasis added)). 
254. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  
255. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10. 
256. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § V (1982), http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YTW-FGJV] [hereinafter 1982 
MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
257. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984).  
258. Id. at 26,834, § 3.5. 
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offered a limited defense in “extraordinary cases,”259 the 1984 DOJ 
Merger Guidelines marked a further shift. Efficiencies were no longer a 
stand-alone defense as such but were part of the competitive effects 
analysis that the agency would undertake for a potential merger. A list of 
criteria for which efficiencies would be evaluated under the 1984 Merger 
Guidelines offered something of a roadmap to potential merging 
parties.
260
 The 1984 Merger Guidelines explained that the “efficiency-
enhancing potential . . . [of mergers] can increase the competitiveness of 
firms and result in lower prices to consumers.”261 In doing so, the 1984 
Guidelines noted that it never ignored efficiency claims.
262
 Subsequent 
to the 1984 Merger Guidelines, case law that examined merger 
efficiencies played a minor role through the rest of the 1980s.
263
 
Efficiencies resurfaced in 1991 in the health care antitrust context for 
a merger in Georgia. The Eleventh Circuit in FTC v. University Health, 
Inc.
264
 noted that “an efficiency defense to the government’s prima facie 
case in section 7 challenges is appropriate in certain circumstances.”265 
The Eleventh Circuit added, “[w]e conclude that in certain 
circumstances, a defendant may rebut the government’s prima facie case 
with evidence showing that the intended merger would create significant 
efficiencies in the relevant market.”266 This case is important because 
courts have repeatedly cited University Health in health care mergers.
267
 
                                                     
259. See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 240, at 218, 220 (offering a description and critique of the 
changes in efficiencies in the merger guidelines). 
260. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,834, § 3.5 (“Cognizable efficiencies include, but 
are not limited to, achieving economies of scale, better integration of production facilities, plant 
specialization, lower transportation costs, and similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, 
servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms. The Department may also consider 
claimed efficiencies resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative, and overhead 
expenses, or that otherwise do not relate to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution 
operations of the merging firms, although, as a practical matter, these types of efficiencies may be 
difficult to demonstrate.”). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 26,835. 
263. Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2058–61. 
264. 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
265. Id. at 1222. 
266. Id. 
267. See, e.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); Saint 
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 
2015); ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Tenet Healthcare 
Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 
2012); HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Grp., 960 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1997); FTC 
v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d mem., 121 F.3d 708 (6th 
Cir. 1997).  
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University Health articulated that efficiencies could be based on price, 
quality, and new products.
268
 Further, it articulated the criteria for 
cognizable efficiencies from the deal as merger-specific efficiencies that 
are verifiable and “do not arise from anti-competitive reductions in 
output or service.”269 The efficiencies also needed to be merger-specific 
in the sense that something less than a full merger could not accomplish 
the same outcome.
270
 Case law has recognized the efficiencies as laid out 
in the merger guidelines and adopted the 1992/1997 and 2000 Merger 
Guideline’s approach to the efficiencies inquiry.271 
Though the 2010 Merger Guidelines revised the approach to merger 
analysis, the efficiencies section of the 2010 Guidelines (renumbered 
Section 10) remained mostly untouched.
272
 Yet, efficiencies are also 
mentioned in earlier sections of the Guidelines. In section 2.2.1 the 
agencies state that they will “look for reliable evidence” of merger 
efficiencies.
273
 This includes that “[t]he Agencies give careful 
consideration to the views of individuals whose responsibilities, 
expertise, and experience relating to the issues in question provide 
particular indicia of reliability. The financial terms of the transaction 
may also be informative regarding competitive effects.”274 Beyond this 
list of evidence, the details of what sort of information constitutes 
efficiencies is not clearly spelled out. Similarly, section 6.1, which 
discusses merger simulation models, allows the agencies to incorporate 
merger efficiencies into their models.
275
 
The remainder of the efficiencies analysis is articulated in section 
10.
276
 According to the formulation of the Guidelines, the efficiencies 
must be specific to the merger, cognizable to the merger (merger 
                                                     
268. See, for example, sources cited supra note 267. 
269. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
merger-review/hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/26G5-HRMM]. 
270. Id. at 31 n.35 (“The Agency will not deem efficiencies to be merger-specific if they could be 
preserved by practical alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as divestiture or 
licensing. If a merger affects not whether but only when an efficiency would be achieved, only the 
timing advantage is a merger-specific efficiency.”). 
271. See Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2063–67; D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, 
Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 51–53 
(2011). 
272. See Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 271, at 54. 
273. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 2.2.1. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. § 6.1. 
276. Id. § 10. 
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specific), and verifiable.
277
 Since the issuance of the 2010 Guidelines, 
various courts have cited to this in dicta.
278
 In health care, the types of 
efficiency claims tend to include: 
improved quality of care, including improved patient outcomes, 
avoidance of capital expenditures, consolidation of management 
and operations support jobs, consolidation of specific services to 
one location (e.g., all cardiac care at hospital A and all cancer 
treatment at hospital B), and reduction of operational costs (e.g., 
savings in purchasing or accounting costs).
279
 
In the previous Part, we discussed the economics of efficiencies and 
provided a numerical example of how little change is necessary for 
significant efficiencies to emerge from a merger. Yet, the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines, adopting the language of the 1997 addition to the 1992 
Merger Guidelines, suggest a sliding scale that seems to require 
“extraordinary” efficiencies for the efficiencies to overcome the anti-
competitive effects.
280
 As the 2010 Merger Guidelines explain: 
In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply 
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the 
magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the 
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive effect 
of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and 
the more they must be passed through to customers, for the 
Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When the potential 
adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to be particularly 
substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies would 
be necessary to prevent the merger from being 
anticompetitive.
281
 
The Guidelines go even further in expressing skepticism of what 
extraordinary efficiencies might ever exist. The Guidelines state, “In the 
Agencies’ experience efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in 
merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the 
efficiencies, are not great. Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to 
monopoly or near-monopoly.”282 Perhaps because of the agencies’ own 
skepticism, in spite of a sliding scale for efficiencies, courts have not 
                                                     
277. Id. 
278. See, e.g., United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011).  
279. Feinstein et al., supra note 93, at 882.  
280. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 10. 
281. Id.  
282. Id. 
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clearly articulated what constitutes “extraordinary efficiencies.”283 The 
lack of guidance of what this might mean prevents effective planning. If 
“extraordinary efficiencies” are possible (as they probably should have 
been found to have been in Heinz), then there should be an articulation 
of what such a standard may be in the case law. 
Of all of the litigated merger cases since the introduction of the 
efficiencies section of the 1992 Merger Guidelines, only one case, 
Heinz, has provided significant analysis to the efficiencies.
284
 The case 
involved a three-to-two merger of baby food companies between the 
number two and three players in the market (Heinz and Beechnut), in 
which the market leader was Gerber.
285
 In what was a national market, 
supermarkets always carried the market leading Gerber.
286
 However, 
supermarkets rarely carried all three baby food companies. 
Both Heinz and Beechnut had advantages, one in the quality of the 
baby food and the other in more efficient production facilities.
287
 The 
parties suggested that the efficiencies from the merger would be in the 
range of $9.4–12 million due to moving all production to the Heinz 
manufacturing facility in Pittsburgh (and shutting down an antiquated 
plant in upstate New York).
288
 The variable cost savings of the 
manufacturing consolidation and plant closure would have created a 
forty-three percent variable cost reduction.
289
 The parties also claimed 
efficiencies in distribution of fifteen percent due to the proposed 
merger.
290
 In contrast, the FTC made a number of claims. These claims 
included: (1) that the efficiencies did not outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects, (2) that these efficiencies were not cognizable to the merger, and 
(3) that such efficiencies could have been achieved through other 
means.
291
 The district court ruled in favor of the merging parties based 
upon the efficiency claims and denied the FTC request for a preliminary 
injunction to block the merger. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the 
district court’s holding.292 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
                                                     
283. See Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 271, at 60 (“What has not been discussed at length in the 
literature, agency speeches and policy statements, the Commentary, the Merger Guidelines, or case 
law is a detailed analysis of the application of the sliding scale approach . . . .”). 
284. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–24 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
285. Id. at 711–13; FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 192–94 (D.D.C. 2000).  
286. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 193. 
287. See Heinz, 246 F.3d at 721. 
288. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 199. 
289. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 721. 
290. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 199. 
291. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720–21. 
292. Id.  
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merging parties could not prove that the efficiencies outweighed the 
anti-competitive effects of the proposed transaction under the 1992/97 
Merger Guidelines.
293
 
A number of hospital merger cases prior to the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines have discussed efficiencies but in a more limited 
way.
294
 Many of these cases and their nuances were not cited by St. 
Luke’s district and circuit court decisions in terms of determining both 
the cost and quality based efficiencies. Overall, the analysis of 
efficiencies in both wins and losses for the government in health care 
cases have demonstrated a cursory analysis of efficiencies that is much 
shorter than other parts of the competitive effects analysis. 
Perhaps courts’ analyses of efficiencies are not surprising if the cases 
that go to litigation and that get decided are atypical cases—so one sided 
that there is a selection bias and where the parties cannot overcome the 
merger burden shift of Baker Hughes. This shift first requires the 
plaintiff make a prima facie case of illegality followed by a burden shift 
to the merging parties to show efficiencies.
295
 However, the fact that the 
merging parties do not abandon the transaction suggests that they believe 
they can overcome the structural presumption. If this is the case, the 
parties often believe that they have compelling merger efficiencies. Even 
if the parties overestimate their chances of success, at least in some 
cases, the efficiencies must be real enough that the parties are willing to 
spend the financial resources to go to court based on their assessment of 
the case. If so, the overly light (and often simplistic) treatment of 
efficiencies by the courts suggests that unlike an issue like market 
definition, courts feel uncomfortable in analyzing the efficiencies of a 
particular hospital merger. The lack of comfort with a serious 
efficiencies analysis condemns potentially pro-competitive mergers. 
Without a clearer sense of what efficiencies count in the courts and what 
efficiencies might be “extraordinary,” unnecessary deal uncertainty leads 
to suboptimal antitrust policy. 
Though the 2010 Merger Guidelines were not meant to be applied in a 
step-by-step fashion,
296
 this is exactly how courts have undertaken their 
                                                     
293. Id. at 721–22. 
294. See infra this Section. 
295. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
296. The Commentary explained that “[e]ach of the Guidelines’ sections identifies a distinct 
analytical element that the Agencies apply in an integrated approach to merger review. The ordering 
of these elements in the Guidelines, however, is not itself analytically significant, because the 
Agencies do not apply the Guidelines as a linear, step-by-step progression that invariably starts with 
market definition and ends with efficiencies or failing assets.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 (2006), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/ 
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analysis in merger cases, proceeding linearly through each factor.
297
 In 
the cases to date under the 2010 Merger Guidelines, by the time that 
courts reached efficiencies, often they had made up their minds about the 
competitive effects without engaging in serious analysis of the 
efficiencies. The 2010 Merger Guidelines were supposed to correct for 
this bias. 
C. Hospital Merger Efficiencies—An Assessment of the Cases 
Since the introduction of efficiencies as part of the competitive effects 
analysis, a number of courts have grappled with how to assess the 
efficiencies regarding both cost and quality, as we note below.
298
 
Overall, our assessment is that courts consider cost-based efficiencies in 
greater depth than quality-based efficiencies. Nevertheless, no court has 
yet found efficiencies that overcome the presumption in Baker Hughes. 
Similarly, no case has overcome anti-competitive effects as part of the 
sliding scale that is “extraordinary.”299 
We begin with an analytical summary of the health care cases and 
their discussion of efficiencies. The FTC lost In re Adventist Health 
System/West
300
 before an administrative law judge. In that case, the 
judge found efficiencies that outweighed the anti-competitive effects.
301
 
This was based on the scale efficiencies that the two small hospitals 
would have with regard to price. The judge also discussed quality 
efficiencies in the form of achieved efficiencies by reduced patient 
length of stay through improved case management.
302
 Yet, the 
efficiencies discussion was short relative to other claims. 
In FTC v. Freeman Hospital,
303
 the district court found that there 
would be efficiencies based on economies of scale of the merging parties 
                                                     
commentaryonthehorizontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/38RK-ZMVT]. 
297. See Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1, 459 (2007) (“Although the courts discuss 
merger analysis as a step-by-step process, the steps are, in reality, interrelated factors, each designed 
to enable the fact-finder to determine whether a transaction is likely to create or enhance existing 
market power.”). 
298. See infra this Section. 
299. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
300. Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. 224 (1994). 
301. Id. at 277–78 (“[C]onclude that the full consolidation of UAH and UGH would result, over 
time, in significant cost savings as compared with the cost which would be incurred by UGH and 
UAH if they were to operate as separate facilities.”). 
302. Id. at 276. 
303. 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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in a relatively short paragraph.
304
 There was no discussion of quality-
based efficiencies. 
The merger in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.
305
 of hospitals in 
Grand Rapids, Michigan had both cost and quality efficiencies 
arguments. Cost-based efficiencies received a significant analysis. The 
court reasoned that “[t]he parties’ experts have provided detailed 
estimates of the capital expenditure savings and operating efficiencies 
that would be realized by defendants in the event of merger.”306 The 
court devoted eight paragraphs to its discussion of cost-based 
efficiencies. 
Regarding quality efficiencies, Butterworth pledged “to provide 
quality healthcare programs for the underserved without regard to ability 
to pay.”307 The court’s discussion on quality efficiencies was sparse. 
However, the court noted that “[w]hile both hospitals are presently well-
maintained, there is no question that the physical limitations of the 
Blodgett site significantly hinder Blodgett’s ability to continue to 
successfully compete with Butterworth and attract the best qualified 
physicians as medical services and technology continue to evolve.”308 
Both the cost and quality efficiencies convinced the court that the 
merger should be permitted to provide for “world-class” facilities in 
western Michigan.
309
 
In United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,
310
 DOJ 
challenged the merger of Long Island Jewish Medical Center and North 
Shore Health Systems, Inc.
311
 The court found for the merging parties. 
After a lengthy analysis, the court concluded that the cost-based 
efficiencies warranted allowing the merger.
312
 The court also 
incorporated quality-based arguments (in a much shorter analysis) as a 
justification for allowing the merger. The court did so based on the non-
                                                     
304. Id. at 1224.  
305. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d mem., 121 
F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997). 
306. Id. at 1300. 
307. Id. at 1306. 
308. Id. at 1301. 
309. Id. at 1302. 
310. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
311. Id. at 125. 
312. Id. at 148 (“Among these merger-related savings are: a reduction in personnel in various 
departments of both hospitals, including the financial departments and pain management; some 
reduction in the cost of clinical laboratory services and medical supplies; claims recovery costs and 
utilities; laundry costs; in-house consulting services; and computer and information services. Also, 
there will be some capital avoidance savings in amounts difficult to ascertain.”). 
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profit status of the hospitals, and the mission of the merging parties, 
which was “to provide high quality health care to economically 
disadvantaged and elderly members of the community.”313 
The FTC challenged a hospital merger in Poplar Bluff, Missouri in 
FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.
314
 At the district court level, the court 
took the merging parties to task for failing to provide compelling 
evidence for supposed cost-based savings based on reducing excess bed 
capacity, consolidating services, and reducing staffing.
315
 The merging 
parties also claimed potential quality efficiencies based on scale 
economies. These economies of scale would allow for increased 
numbers of tertiary medical services, such as open heart surgery, but that 
such efficiencies were out of market efficiencies (since primary care was 
the relevant market).
316
 Finally the court reasoned that the cost-based 
efficiencies would not be passed on to consumers.
317
 
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reexamined the efficiencies findings of 
the lower court.
318
 It noted, “[w]e further find that although Tenet’s 
efficiencies defense may have been properly rejected by the district 
court, the district court should nonetheless have considered evidence of 
enhanced efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of the 
merger.”319 In a sense, the Eighth Circuit was concerned that the lower 
court’s analysis of efficiencies was spotty. In fact, this is exactly the 
problem that the overview of cases show more generally—courts pay too 
little attention to the efficiencies analysis. In Tenet, in particular, the 
Eighth Circuit noted that the lower court did not effectively examine the 
quality efficiencies, noting that “[t]he reality of the situation in our 
changing healthcare environment may be that Poplar Bluff cannot 
support two high-quality hospitals.”320 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 
discussed that the lower court placed “an inordinate emphasis on price 
competition”321 rather than on quality competition. 
                                                     
313. Id. at 149. Subsequent empirical work suggests that the non-profit story is mixed. See Jill R. 
Horwitz & Austin Nichols, Hospital Ownership and Medical Services: Market Mix, Spillover 
Effects, and Nonprofit Objectives, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 924 (2009); Barak D. Richman, Antitrust 
and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (2008). 
314. 17 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
315. Id. at 948. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. See FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). 
319. Id. at 1054. 
320. Id. at 1055. 
321. Id. at 1054, 1055. 
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In In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., the merging 
parties offered quality improvements in the form of a $120 million 
investment and the expansion of services in over sixteen service areas.
322
 
As this was a post-consummated merger challenge, the FTC countered 
that quality had not actually improved.
323
 Where there were quality 
improvements, the FTC argued that the quality improvements could 
have been reached short of a merger.
324
 The FTC also argued that the 
purported quality improvements could not justify the post-merger price 
increases.
325
 Nevertheless, quality claims seem to carry some weight for 
the FTC even though the Commission voted that the merger was anti-
competitive. The Commission could have sought structural separation, 
as FTC complaint counsel had sought (and which we think probably was 
the correct remedy). However, the Commission noted that full 
divestiture was not advisable because the improvement in cardiac 
surgery at Highland Park (a quality efficiency) would not have been 
sustainable with a divestiture because the lack of scale economies would 
have meant that the necessary volume without the merger would not 
have been possible.
326
 
After the issuance of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, additional hospital 
merger cases have explored efficiencies, as we explain herein. One such 
case was FTC v. OSF Healthcare System,
327
 a merger from three to two 
hospitals in Rockford, Illinois.
328
 In that case, the defendants claimed 
two types of cost-based efficiencies. The first was recurring cost savings 
due to consolidation (economies of scale).
329
 The second was cost 
savings based upon one-time capital avoidance savings.
330
 The court 
undertook a significant analysis of both types of purported cost 
efficiencies before holding that neither efficiency was extraordinary to 
overcome the structural presumption of anti-competitive effects.
331
 In 
contrast, the court gave short shrift to the quality efficiencies. These 
quality efficiencies were perhaps more compelling than the cost-based 
efficiencies. The quality improvements could lead to clinical 
                                                     
322. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1, 507 (2007). 
323. Id. at 510–11. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 521–22. 
327. 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 1089–92. 
330. Id.  
331. Id. at 1088–95. 
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effectiveness. The court dismissed this claim.
332
 The parties also argued 
a second quality claim, that the merger would result in “Centers of 
Excellence” that would allow the merged hospital to recruit 
specialists.
333
 The court also dismissed this claimed efficiency in short 
order as too speculative and which might be possible short of a 
merger.
334
 Another case was a trial court decision in FTC v. ProMedica 
Health System, Inc.,
335
 in which the court below found no efficiencies.
336
 
Overall, the hospital merger cases show that courts rarely spend much 
focus on their analysis of efficiencies. Often the efficiencies analysis is a 
throw-away section of a decision—merely a summary, rather than an in-
depth analysis of issues that is customary in other areas of the analysis, 
like defining the relevant product market or questions of entry for 
example. 
D. Efficiencies in St. Luke’s 
The district court judge in St. Luke’s identified that the ACA 
was driving a push to efficiencies in health care.
337
 However, while 
noting the benefits of consolidation, the court found the limits to the 
specific claimed efficiencies based on the 2010 Merger Guidelines. The 
district court misidentified the efficiencies as a defense rather than as 
part of the competitive effects analysis.
338
 This misreads how 
efficiencies have been treated since the 1984 Merger Guidelines, when 
efficiencies were first treated as a factor in the competitive analysis 
rather than as a defense.
339
 FTC v. University Health, Inc.
 
 was the first 
circuit court case to make a more significant embrace of merger 
efficiencies as a way to rebut claims of anti-competitive effects.
340
 
The St. Luke’s district court judge did recognize the difficulty in 
adjudicating the case. Given the difficulty of unraveling post-
                                                     
332. Id. at 1092–93. 
333. Id. at 1093. 
334. Id. at 1093–94. 
335. No. 3:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011). 
336. Id. at *57–60. 
337. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV-
00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *1 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 
775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
338. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 
F.3d 775, 788–93 (9th Cir. 2015).  
339. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,834 (June 29, 1984); Greene & Sokol, 
supra note 10, at 2059. 
340. See Greene & Sokol, supra note 10, at 2061–62 
04 - Blair Durrance Sokol.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/27/2016  2:56 PM 
64 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1 
 
consummated mergers, one concluding remark by the judge was 
interesting: 
  In a world that was not governed by the Clayton Act, the best 
result might be to approve the Acquisition and monitor its 
outcome to see if the predicted price increases actually occurred. 
In other words, the Acquisition could serve as a controlled 
experiment. 
  But the Clayton Act is in full force, and it must be enforced. 
The Act does not give the Court discretion to set it aside to 
conduct a health care experiment.
341
 
The stakes in health care are high and because the so-called 
unscrambling of a merger by remedying a merger that already has been 
consummated is not easy,
342
 this may explain the sustained importance 
of the structural presumption for mergers. 
If the numerical example we explained earlier via formal proof is 
correct, then the efficiencies needed to be “extraordinary” are not that 
large. This also changes what the government would need to weigh in 
deciding whether or not to bring a challenge. Put differently, are there no 
price increases with quality improvements that may overcome the anti-
competitive effects? According to government enforcers, this situation 
has only been a hypothetical one.
343
 Based on our numerical example, 
such a hypothetical may in fact be possible. 
On appeal, the use of efficiencies in the Ninth Circuit was questioned 
at its most basic level by the circuit court panel.
344
 The opinion stated, 
“[w]e remain skeptical about the efficiencies defense in general and 
about its scope in particular.”345 The Ninth Circuit has been more critical 
of efficiencies analysis than any other circuit in the modern antitrust era. 
Not only was the Ninth Circuit unduly skeptical of efficiencies, it may 
have been wrong as to the case law. Put differently, even as a matter of 
law, the Ninth Circuit overplays its claim that merger efficiencies are 
illegal.
346
 At least implicitly, efficiencies in the merger context have 
                                                     
341. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *25. 
342. See Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 1 (2007) (exemplifying the difficulty in 
remedying a successful post-consummated merger challenge). 
343. Feinstein et al., supra note 93, at 883 (“However, it is more difficult to determine how best 
to balance a possible price increase, on the one hand, and a quality improvement, on the other hand. 
To date, however, that is not something the federal antitrust agencies have had to do.”). 
344. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 
F.3d 775, 790 (9th Cir. 2015).  
345. Id. 
346. Id. at 788–89 (“The Supreme Court has never expressly approved an efficiencies defense to 
a § 7 claim. Indeed, Brown Shoe cast doubt on the defense.”). 
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been recognized by the Supreme Court in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colorado, Inc.
347
 In Cargill, the issue was antitrust injury in the merger 
context.
348
 The Court explained, “[t]o hold that the antitrust laws protect 
competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition 
[because of efficiencies] would, in effect, render illegal any decision by 
a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share.”349 The Court went 
on to explain, “[t]he antitrust laws require no such perverse result, for 
‘[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage 
in vigorous price competition, including price competition.’”350 
We note a further problem with the Ninth’s Circuit’s efficiency 
analysis. The Ninth Circuit noted that prices might go up post-merger.
351
 
The court did not grapple with the issue of how to deal with price 
increases on the one hand and improved quality of service on the other. 
Quite the opposite. The Ninth Circuit explained: 
But even if we assume that the claimed efficiencies were 
merger-specific, the defense would nonetheless fail. At most, the 
district court concluded that St. Luke’s might provide better 
service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal, but 
the Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen competition 
or create monopolies simply because the merged entity can 
improve its operations.
352
 
Such language is unfortunate. Lacking in the opinion was a way to 
address the situation of improved quality but increased price. Such a 
situation of the interplay of different types of efficiencies and anti-
competitive effects in the context of the sliding scale, had the merging 
parties assertions of efficiencies been true, would have presented a novel 
issue, one where the merging parties claimed quality enhancing merger 
efficiencies in their electronic records system (even if price might have 
increased). 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Antitrust health care merger law remains unnecessarily murky after 
the St. Luke’s appellate decision. It does so in a number of areas. The 
proper use of efficiencies to rebut the prima facie merger challenge is 
                                                     
347. 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
348. Id. 
349. Id. at 116. 
350. Id. (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir. 
1984)). 
351. See St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791. 
352. Id. at 791–92. 
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less in line with economic theory than it need be. It may be that there is 
an impressive analysis of competitive effects and efficiencies before the 
agencies.
353
 Before the courts, the competitive effects analysis 
(particularly efficiencies analysis) provided in St. Luke’s is an accurate 
(albeit lamentable) reflection of how competitive effects get analyzed 
before the courts. In such cases, courts stick to the Baker Hughes 
formulation as embodied in Heinz without a detailed analysis of what 
extraordinary efficiencies would entail.
354
 This set of presumptions in 
the case law may explain why we do not see efficiencies realized in 
decided court cases—it could be selection effect of the cases that go to 
trial are not the ones with the strongest efficiencies; it could be the 
procedural presumptions; or it could be that the efficiencies are real but 
judges simply discount them. The cases suggest in terms of the amount 
of text offered for efficiencies that judges are discounting efficiencies in 
their analysis. Before the agencies, in contrast, efficiencies seem to be 
taken seriously.
355
 
In a recent paper, Professor Hovenkamp summarizes the ambiguity of 
efficiencies under the current statutory scheme.
356
 He explains: 
  The “substantially lessen competition” language in § 7 is not 
                                                     
353. We do not reject the possibility that the best cases for efficiencies are those that the antitrust 
agencies accept by not challenging a proposed merger. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Statement of 
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Delta Air 
Lines’ Acquisition of an Equity Interest in Virgin Atlantic Airways (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-
investigation-delta [https://perma.cc/6QR6-YX8S].  
354. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“In United States v. Baker 
Hughes Inc., we explained the analytical approach by which the government establishes a section 7 
violation. First the government must show that the merger would produce ‘a firm controlling an 
undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result[] in a significant increase in the 
concentration of firms in that market.’ Such a showing establishes a ‘presumption’ that the merger 
will substantially lessen competition. To rebut the presumption, the defendants must produce 
evidence that ‘show[s] that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger’s] 
probable effects on competition’ in the relevant market. ‘If the defendant successfully rebuts the 
presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect 
shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with 
the government at all times.’ Although Baker Hughes was decided at the merits stage as opposed to 
the preliminary injunctive relief stage, we can nonetheless use its analytical approach in evaluating 
the Commission’s showing of likelihood of success.” (internal citations omitted)). 
355. See MALCOM B. COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, ECONOMIC ISSUES: MERGER EFFICIENCIES 
AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1997–2007 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/reports/merger-efficiencies-federal-trade-commission-1997–2007/0902 
mergerefficiencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X2X-VSU9]; Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, FTC, Remarks 
at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2002 Fall Forum: Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of 
Ongoing Evolution (Nov. 8, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2002/11/efficiencies-and-
antitrust-story-ongoing-evolution [https://perma.cc/E6MM-HDX7]. 
356. See Hovenkamp, supra note 240.  
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self-defining, and it has meant different things at different times. 
Lessening competition could be a reference to simple rivalry, or 
the number of firms in a market. In that case every horizontal 
merger lessens competition by reducing the number of rivals. 
The statutory phrase might also refer to general welfare, which 
would trade off possible consumer injuries against efficiency 
gains. Finally, it could be a reference to output and lower prices: 
a merger “substantially” lessens competition if it reduces output 
in the market, with the result that prices rise. This definition 
comes closest to the approach to merger policy reflected in the 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and applied today by the 
antitrust enforcement Agencies and courts.
357
 
If Hovenkamp is correct that there are multiple potential meanings to 
exploring efficiencies under the law and that the Merger Guidelines 
focus on reduction of output, this leads to some potential concern for 
antitrust policy. First, courts and agencies do not seem to properly grasp 
how to address quality-based efficiencies—what to measure and how to 
apply this if quality goes up even while cost remains the same or even 
increases. 
Without a clear goal as to what quality efficiencies mean, it is 
difficult to block a merger that reduces quality. Similarly, it is difficult to 
credit efficiencies to a merger that would enhance quality. This is a hard 
task because quality can mean so many things depending on the context. 
The most administrable quality measurement is what the federal 
government already uses for CMS. However, that fails to include many 
other important types of quality competition. Quantifying quality-based 
efficiencies is not an easy task. As Dafny explains, “Quantifying these 
benefits is particularly difficult because of the dearth of relevant 
empirical research and the lack of consensus on what should be 
measured and what value should be assigned to it.”358 Yet, this 
quantification is important to provide an effective counter-story to the 
anti-competitive effects analysis. If the agencies and courts provided 
clearer and more specific guidance of what quality efficiencies to 
measure, merging parties might better collect data to prove a quality 
enhancing efficiencies argument. 
To operationalize a workable legal test is very difficult on quality 
enhancing efficiencies. However, the test should not focus on the 
specific quality in question. The test should allow any form of 
quantifiable quality efficiencies. The administrability in the test comes 
                                                     
357. Id. at 3. 
358. Dafny, supra note 20, at 198. 
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from a better articulation of what sort of efficiencies may be required 
under the “sliding scale”359 that courts mention but do not articulate a 
test for along these lines. 
Unfortunately, the ultimate end game of the sliding scale is not clear. 
That is, there is no clear definition in case law or agency guidance 
regarding what extraordinary efficiencies might mean. Such guidance 
would be helpful.
360
 To suggest that efficiencies need to be extraordinary 
without explaining what extraordinary means allows courts, such as the 
appellate court in St. Luke’s, to question whether efficiencies that would 
outweigh the competitive effects could ever exist. This opening allowed 
the Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s to provide unwarranted and overly harsh 
criticism of efficiencies that fly in the face of forty years of efficiencies 
in both mergers and conduct cases.
361
 
Efficiencies are challenging before agencies and courts. As one court 
explained, “[t]his de facto defense is a difficult one to pursue because 
the alleged efficiencies are often speculative and vigorously disputed by 
the testimony of contradicting experts. In addition, the extent to which 
these efficiencies would endure to the benefit of the consumer is often 
difficult to measure.”362 The reality is that efficiencies work before the 
agency if the data is strong. As Chairman Ramirez recently stated,  
[i]n a number of cases, efficiencies have played a role in our 
decision not to take action against proposed mergers. Moreover, 
the cases that we bring tend to be ones with evidence of 
significant anticompetitive effects that are unlikely to be offset 
by the routine, garden-variety efficiency claims we typically 
encounter from parties.
363
  
Nevertheless, agency pronouncements on the types of efficiency 
arguments that have worked (and more than just a line or two in a press 
release) would be helpful to the practitioner community in providing 
guidance. 
At least in the Ninth Circuit, using efficiencies arguments to 
overcome the Baker Hughes presumption is difficult if not impossible. 
                                                     
359. See Sokol & Fishkin, supra note 271. 
360. See id. 
361. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 
F.3d 775, 788–93 (9th Cir. 2015); Shelanski, supra note 7. 
362. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
363. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Global Antitrust 
Enforcement Symposium, Georgetown University Law Center: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
Five Years Later (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
805441/ramirez__georgetown_antitrust_enforcement_symposium_9-29-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7BT4-687F]. 
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The reliance on “hot documents”364 in court, rather than focusing on the 
empirical data, means that the antitrust agencies are sacrificing good 
case law analysis for storytelling to win cases.
365
 This has gone on for 
some time, most notably in United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc.
366
 Not 
surprisingly, judges focus not on the complex economics of cases but on 
the bad documents because it provides them an analytical shortcut to 
reach their preferred outcome. Even if the merging parties could not 
prove the efficiencies in St. Luke’s, the lack of a serious focus on the 
efficiencies deters those mergers that are close calls for the agencies. In 
the future, such mergers will not be contemplated, which will ultimately 
hurt consumers. 
Bilateral monopoly and vertical merger issues also remain important 
issues for further analysis. When properly identified, a situation of 
bilateral monopoly is superior from a welfare perspective than a prior 
market structure.
367
 In situations in which merging parties argue that 
increased provider concentration is important to counteract the power of 
payers (insurers), understanding when bilateral monopoly does and does 
not exist plays a critical role in analyzing the competitive effects of a 
potential merger. The St. Luke’s case did not sufficiently grapple with 
this set of claims. This lack of sophisticated analysis is disappointing 
because the contours of the power-buyer analysis in the Merger 
Guidelines remains under-explored in decided cases.
368
 
Further, issues of foreclosure remain ones that lack contemporary 
guidance in merger case law. Ever since the game theory revolution and 
                                                     
364. David A. Balto, ‘Hot’ Documents Do Not Tell the Whole Story in Antitrust, LAW360 (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/430886/hot-documents-do-not-tell-the-whole-story-in-
antitrust [https://perma.cc/9YL8-LEGM] (describing “hot documents”). 
365. Michael Cohen, Comments of Michael Cohen on Bazaarvoice, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION 
POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 27, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/ 
2014/01/comments-of-michael-cohen-on-bazaarvoice.html [https://perma.cc/3WCE-RVAZ] (“One 
lesson of Bazaarvoice may be the simple conclusion that bad documents—of any sort—will land a 
merger in court, regardless of whether the case should be there.”). 
366. See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13–CV–00133–WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
367. See Blair & Sokol, Rule of Reason, supra note 171, at 493. 
368. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 33, § 12 (“The Agencies consider the possibility that 
powerful buyers may constrain the ability of the merging parties to raise prices. This can occur, for 
example, if powerful buyers have the ability and incentive to vertically integrate upstream or 
sponsor entry, or if the conduct or presence of large buyers undermines coordinated effects. 
However, the Agencies do not presume that the presence of powerful buyers alone forestalls adverse 
competitive effects flowing from the merger. Even buyers that can negotiate favorable terms may be 
harmed by an increase in market power.”); see also John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and 
Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1483 (2012). 
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a series of papers that examine vertical foreclosure in mergers,
369
 there 
have been a set of theoretical articles that challenged the Chicago belief 
that vertical mergers should be nearly per se legal.
370
 What might 
constitute practical guidance from case law would better settle these 
questions. Such guidance could take the form of consents (rather 
problematic because of the desire of parties to settle to get a deal 
through) rather than modern vertical merger guidelines or case law.
371
 St. 
Luke’s could have provided such a decided case based analysis but did 
not. The development of policy via merger consent decrees and the 
potential anti-competitive effects of some of these consents may follow 
directly from the lack of effective case law treatment of vertical merger 
claims.
372
 
The overall impact of the St. Luke’s case has broader repercussions. 
The lack of certainty about how best to design efficient health care with 
lower costs and higher quality creates the possibility of mixed messages 
being sent to the business community. On the one hand, greater 
integration through merger or ACOs is to be encouraged. On the other 
hand, the antitrust risk of such integration being blocked, not always in a 
way that is predictable based on sound economic reasoning, creates 
business uncertainty. 
The St. Luke’s case is a missed opportunity, in light of the lack of 
Supreme Court guidance on mergers, to articulate a clear and well-
reasoned analysis of a merger case that encourages cost-reducing and 
quality-enhancing efficiencies. The lack of clear articulation on 
efficiencies has a broader impact on ACO analysis, and this lack of 
clarity might push hospitals to go for an all-or-nothing approach of 
acquisitions of physician groups. Similarly, lack of sophisticated 
reasoning on bilateral monopoly and foreclosure suggests that gaps 
remain in merger analysis in the courts that future cases must address. 
 
                                                     
369. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, The “Foreclosure” Effects of Vertical 
Mergers, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 207 (1991); Janusz A. Ordover et al., 
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. 
Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); 
Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988); 
Salinger, supra note 29. 
370. See, e.g., Robert H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 225 
(1978). 
371. James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Getting Vertical Mergers Through the Agencies: 
“Let’s Make a Deal,” ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 10 (noting that “the relevant guidance comes not 
from the case law, the Vertical Guidelines, or modern economic theory”). 
372. John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement 
Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619 (2013). 
